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posteriori ambiguity is absent. Instead, a form of ambiguity known as IID ambiguity that is to model agents
after they have learned all that they can has been the dominant specification in the literature. But when do we
have the conjectured IID ambiguity? When does ambiguity resolve and when does it not? When it persists,
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uncertainty within each model and the uncertainty over the models. An application to portfolio choice shows
that the effect of learning under ambiguity can be significant; the optimal weight on stocks monotonically
decreases as the investor loses confidence and the decrease can be as large as 50\% of wealth. Finally, in an
application to asset pricing, I make three observations regarding the equilibrium equity premium. First,
learning under ambiguity generates a declining trend in the equity premium. Second, an improvement in the
quality of signals can result in a higher equity premium. Third, the relationship between the equity premium
and the conditional variance of returns is uncertain; they may be negatively correlated.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY
Hongseok Choi
Domenico Cuoco
Over the past two decades, the growing literature on ambiguity aversion has shed light
on a number of puzzles in financial economics. In most applications, however, a learning
mechanism that maps observations to a posteriori ambiguity is absent. Instead, a form of
ambiguity known as IID ambiguity that is to model agents after they have learned all that
they can has been the dominant specification in the literature. But when do we have the
conjectured IID ambiguity? When does ambiguity resolve and when does it not? When
it persists, what determines its long-run level and what are reasonable variations? In this
dissertation, I provide answers to these questions by proposing a model of learning under
ambiguity and investigate their implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing.
Specifically, I focus on the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) ambiguity aversion and assume
that agents have the Chen-Epstein (2002) continuous-time recursive multiple-priors utility.
Then, a learning mechanism means a map from each time-state to a set of one-step-ahead
conditionals. I assume that the agents’ beliefs about the data-generating mechanism are rep-
resented by multiple probabilistic models. As data accumulate, they assess the likelihood of
each model, discard the ones with low likelihood, and update the remaining ones by Bayes’
rule model-by-model. The dynamics of learning is explicitly characterized in the form of a
system of differential equations and I observe that in revising their estimates, agents take
into account both the uncertainty within each model and the uncertainty over the models.
An application to portfolio choice shows that the effect of learning under ambiguity can
be significant; the optimal weight on stocks monotonically decreases as the investor loses
confidence and the decrease can be as large as 50% of wealth. Finally, in an application to
asset pricing, I make three observations regarding the equilibrium equity premium. First,
learning under ambiguity generates a declining trend in the equity premium. Second, an
iv
improvement in the quality of signals can result in a higher equity premium. Third, the re-
lationship between the equity premium and the conditional variance of returns is uncertain;
they may be negatively correlated.
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CHAPTER 1 : The Model of Learning under Ambiguity
1.1 Introduction
Standard models in financial economics assume that agents can form a unique probability
measure, called the prior, over uncertain investment opportunities. The uniqueness of the
prior in particular means that the agents can make probabilistic assessments of all relevant
uncertain events with infinite precision. More often than not, however, our knowledge
about the data-generating mechanism in question — for example, how stock returns are
generated — is limited and in such cases it is difficult to assess the likelihoods of uncertainties
precisely. In economics, Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) were the first to recognize the
last possibility, and when an agent is modeled to be unable to form a unique prior, we say
there is Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity.
Ambiguity is behaviorally distinct from risk. The simplest example is an ambiguous
coin (Ellsberg, 1961). Suppose there are two coins, where one is known to be fair; all that is
known about the other coin, on the other hand, is that it has two sides. Then, betting on the
fair coin would be preferred to betting on the ambiguous coin, which cannot be rationalized
by a subjective expected utility model. One resolution to Ellsberg-type paradoxes is Gilboa
and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, or multiple-priors
utility, and, over the past two decades, multiple-priors models have been used to explain a
number of puzzling phenomena in financial markets: stock market nonparticipation (Dow
and Werlang, 1992), excess volatility (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Illeditsch, 2011), excess
equity premium (Chen and Epstein, 2002), and equity home bias (Epstein and Miao, 2003),
to name a few.
In most applications, however, a learning mechanism that maps observations to a poste-
riori ambiguity is absent. Chen and Epstein (2002), who formulate a multiple-priors model
in continuous time, say, “the responsiveness to data permitted by our model is very general
and we do not yet have any compelling structure to add · · · to illustrate the response of
ambiguity to observation.” Hence, they proceed to propose a time-invariant (in a sense to
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be explained later) form of ambiguity that they call independently and indistinguishably
distributed (IID) ambiguity, which is to model “the agent after he has learned all that
he can.” Ever since, IID ambiguity has been the dominant specification of ambiguity in
the literature. See Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Schied (2006, 2007a,b), Schied (2008), Miao
(2009), Routledge and Zin (2009), and Liu (2011) for applications of IID ambiguity to port-
folio choice and Epstein and Miao (2003), Trojani and Vanini (2004), and Gagliardini et al.
(2009) for those to asset pricing. Time-varying ambiguity without a learning mechanism has
been considered by Porchia (2005), Sbuelz and Trojani (2008), and Drechsler (forthcoming).
Naturally, the lack of a learning mechanism is unsatisfactory. For example, when do we
have the conjectured IID ambiguity? When does ambiguity resolve and when does it not?
When it persists, what determines its long-run level and what are reasonable variations?
These questions are important for their relevance to consumption/portfolio choice and asset
pricing. For example, in an economy populated by multiple-priors agents, the equilibrium
equity premium includes a premium for bearing ambiguity as well as the risk premium
and thus the specification of ambiguity has a direct effect on the level of and variations in
equity premia. In this dissertation, I provide answers to the above questions by proposing
a model of learning under ambiguity (Chapter 1) and investigate their implications for
consumption/portfolio choice (Chapter 2) and asset pricing (Chapter 3).
In Chapter 1, I define and solve the learning mechanism. Specifically, in this dissertation
I focus on the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) ambiguity aversion and assume that the agent
has the dynamic version of multiple-priors utility called recursive multiple-priors utility
(Epstein and Schneider, 2003b; Wang, 2003; Chen and Epstein, 2002). Then, the agent’s
beliefs are uniquely characterized by the sequence of the set of one-step-ahead conditionals
and a learning mechanism means a map from each time-state to a set of one-step-ahead
conditionals.
For concreteness, think of an agent who trades in the stock market. Due to limited
knowledge, he cannot narrow down his beliefs about how stock returns are generated to
a single probabilistic model; instead, his beliefs are represented by multiple probabilis-
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tic models. Specifically, the probabilistic models the agent entertains are standard linear
state-space models (Liptser and Shiryaev, 1977, Chapter 12). The agent is certain that
the unobservable state, for example, the instantaneous expected return, is reverting to its
unconditional mean, but lacks confidence in the time-invariance of the latter. Accordingly,
he decomposes the unconditional mean into (i) a time-invariant component, for which he
entertains multiple marginal a priori distributions, and (ii) a time-varying component that
he cannot model probabilistically (Epstein and Schneider, 2007; Walley and Fine, 1982). As
he observes stock returns, he (i) assesses the likelihood of each model, (ii) discards the ones
with low likelihood, and (iii) updates the remaining ones by Bayes’ rule model-by-model.
This gives him a set of one-step-ahead conditionals.
The main result of the chapter is an explicit characterization of the dynamics of learning
in the form of a system of differential equations. In the absence of ambiguity, the weight
on the innovation (unexpected changes in the observable variables) is increasing in the
Bayesian uncertainty in the estimates of the unobservable variables known as estimation
risk; the less trustworthy the current estimates, the more weight given on the new evidence.
I show that in the presence of ambiguity, the weight on the innovation is given by the
sum of estimation risk and a quantity that measures the a posteriori model uncertainty, or
estimation ambiguity. That is, in revising his estimates, the agent takes into account not
only the uncertainty within each model but also the uncertainty over the models.
Furthermore, estimation ambiguity persists if and only if the agent lacks confidence in
the time-invariance of the unconditional mean of the unobservable process. And when it
persists, I identify a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to a constant, that
is, to an IID ambiguity, and compute the limit value; it is increasing in the agent’s lack of
confidence and conservatism in model selection and is decreasing in the variability of the
unobservable process relative to the observable process. In general, the filtering equations
allow us to study the endogenous relationship between the level of a posteriori ambiguity
and other primitives of the model like signal precision.
The model of learning under ambiguity considered in this dissertation is motivated by
3
and is closely related to Epstein and Schneider (2007), who also construct the set of one-
step-ahead conditionals by a likelihood-ratio test over multiple probabilistic models. The
differences between their model and mine are as follows. First, whereas Epstein and Schnei-
der’s model is in discrete time, mine is in continuous time. The transition to continuous time
is more than a technical extension: the continuous-time counterpart of their portfolio choice
example results in no learning because the likelihood function degenerates to infinity every-
where (Section 1.3.3). Thus, in particular, their discrete-time finding that learning resolves
ambiguity does not immediately carry over to continuous time. Second, whereas Epstein
and Schneider focus on memoryless data-generating mechanisms, I consider path-dependent
ones, which clearly complements the former. For example, with the present model, we can
study the effects of learning under ambiguity when stock returns or the growth of dividends
is predictable (Chapter 2 and 3).1
Another paper that considers the learning of a recursive multiple-priors agent is Miao
(2009). Specifically, he considers the consumption/portfolio choice problem of an investor
in continuous time and allows for stochastic investment opportunities. However, his notion
of learning is fundamentally different from mine. Miao’s investor obtains the benchmark
one-step-ahead conditional by updating a reference probability measure and the set of one-
step-ahead conditionals is given by a neighborhood of the benchmark with a fixed radius.
Thus, in particular, learning and ambiguity do not interact. In fact, Miao’s model is the
limit of the present model as the investor gains confidence. See Section 2.5.3.2
The rest of Chapter 1 is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I review Chen and Epstein’s
(2002) continuous-time recursive multiple-priors utility. Section 1.3 motivates the learning
mechanism to be discussed in the subsequent sections. Section 1.4 defines the probabilistic
models that the agent entertains. Section 1.5 defines and solves the learning mechanism.
Section 1.6 discusses the dynamics of learning. All proofs are collected in Section 1.7.
1Campanale (2011) applies Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) model in the context of life-cycle portfolio
choice and Miao and Wang (2011) in the context of job matching. Epstein and Schneider’s (2008) asset
pricing model conforms to the formalism of Epstein and Schneider (2007) but their agents do not discard
any of the models they a priori entertain. See also Knox (2002).
2Liu (2011) considers the consumption/portfolio choice problem of a Miao investor when expected returns
follow a Markov chain.
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1.2 Preferences: Recursive Multiple-Priors
I assume that the agent has Chen and Epstein’s (2002) recursive multiple-priors utility.3
Specifically, time is continuous and varies over [0, T ], T ∈ (0,∞).
Let Ω denote the set of states of Nature and let a filtration G = {Gt} on Ω represent
the accrual of the agent’s information. G is right-continuous.
There is a set P of equivalent probability measures on (Ω,GT ), the set of priors, with the
following properties. Let P 0 ∈ P. There is an ny-dimensional Wiener process  = {(t),Gt}
under P 0 that generates G. (The notation  = {(t),Gt} signifies that the process  is
adapted to the filtration G. All vectors, including the gradient ∂f of a scalar function f ,
are column vectors. Hence, (t) = (1(t), · · · , ny(t))>.) G0 contains all the P 0-null events
in GT . Thus, in particular, G satisfies the usual conditions. Each prior is identified with
the corresponding density generator ξ = {ξ(t),Gt} and is thus written P ξ ∈ P, where
dP ξ
dP 0
= Eξ(T ) (1.1)
and Eξ denotes the Dole´ans-Dade exponential
Eξ(t) , exp
(∫ t
0
ξ(s) d(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
|ξ(s)|2 ds
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
P is required to be rectangular, which means that there is a set-valued process Ξ : [0, T ]×
Ω → 2Rny such that the probability measure P ξ defined by (1.1) is a prior if and only if ξ
is a G-progressive process and ξ(t, ω) ∈ Ξ(t, ω) for Lebesgue×P 0 almost every (t, ω). Since
P consists of equivalent measures, “for Lebesgue×P 0 almost every (t, ω)” is henceforth
abbreviated without ambiguity to “a.e.” Ξ is called the one-step-ahead conditionals process
and is further required to be (i) uniformly bounded, (ii) compact-convex-valued, and (iii)
3In general, recursive multiple-priors utility refers to the recursive extensions of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
(1989) static multiple-priors representation by Epstein and Schneider (2003b), Wang (2003), Hayashi (2005),
Chen and Epstein (2002), and Epstein and Ji (2011). The first three papers axiomatize recursive multiple-
priors in discrete time. Chen and Epstein (2002) formulate it in continuous time assuming that the priors
are mutually absolutely continuous. Epstein and Ji (2011) allow for singular priors.
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“G-progressive”: (i) Ξ(t, ω) ⊂ K a.e. for some bounded K ⊂ Rny , (ii) Ξ(t, ω) is compact-
convex a.e., and (iii) the restriction of Ξ to [0, t] × Ω is B[0, t] ⊗ Gt-measurable4 for all
t ∈ [0, T ] where BX denotes the Borel σ-algebra of a topological space X.
A scalar process c = {c(t),Gt} is a consumption process if it is progressive, positive,
and integrable. Denote the set of consumption processes by C. The agent’s conditional
preferences at time t, t ∈ [0, T ], are represented by
U c(t, ω) = min
P∈P
U c,P (t, ω), c ∈ C (1.2)
where U c,P = {U c,P (s),Gs}, the utility process under P ∈ P, uniquely solves the BSDE
(backward stochastic differential equation)
U c,P (s) = EP
(∫ T
s
F (c(τ), U c,P (τ)) dτ
∣∣∣∣Gs) , t ≤ s ≤ T.
Here, F is the aggregator. See Chen and Epstein (2002), Section 2.5 for the conditions that
the aggregator has to satisfy.
Rectangularity is an essential requirement for the Epstein-Schneider-Wang recursive
representation and hence for their notion of dynamic consistency.5 The utility process U c
defined by (1.2) satisfies
dU c(t) =
(
−F (c(t), U c(t)) + max
ξ(t)∈Ξ(t)
σcU (t)ξ(t)
)
dt+ σcU (t) d(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T (1.3)
with terminal condition U(T ) = 0, for some process σcU = {σcU (t),Gt}. When (1.3) is viewed
as a BSDE, the pair (U c, σcU ) constitutes a solution.
To interpret (1.3), rewrite it, with a slight abuse of notation, as
dU c(t) = −F (c(t), U c(t)) dt+ max
ξ(t)∈Ξ(t)
σcU (t)( d(t) + ξ(t) dt)
4{(s, ω) ∈ [0, t] × Ω : Ξ(s, ω) ∩K′ 6= ∅} ∈ B[0, t] ⊗ Gt for all closed K′ ⊂ K. See Aliprantis and Border
(1999), Sections 16.1, 16.2, and 17.1.
5For a detailed discussion on rectangularity and its connection to dynamic consistency, see Epstein and
Schneider (2003b), Sections 3.1 and 5.2.
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and compare it with the standard, single-prior stochastic differential utility representation
(Duffie and Epstein, 1992)
dU c(t) = −F (c(t), U c(t)) dt+ σcU (t) d(t).
Consider first the single-prior case. By the assumption that  generates G, all changes in
the fundamentals to take place over the infinitesimal future are a function of d(t). In other
words, the agent’s conditional beliefs about the uncertainties to be resolved over the next
instant are summarized by the unique distribution N(0, dt) for the “one-step-ahead” noise
d(t). Now, the representation for the ambiguity-averse agent suggests the interpretation
that he entertains a set of plausible distributions N(ξ(t), dt), ξ(t) ∈ Ξ(t). And a pessimist,
he assesses c under the belief that the distribution that is the worst for c is the case.6
1.3 Learning under Ambiguity: Preliminary Discussion
Modeling learning dynamics in the context of recursive multiple-priors amounts to impos-
ing a particular structure on the set of priors beyond rectangularity. Since a rectangular
set of priors uniquely determines a one-step-ahead conditionals process and vice versa, it
is equivalent to defining a map from an observation (t, ω) to a set of one-step-ahead con-
ditionals Ξ(t, ω), which is both conceptually and operationally preferable for the following
reasons. First, the set of one-step-ahead conditionals at a certain point in time precisely
models the agent’s conditional beliefs; in a Bayesian model, the map is the Bayesian up-
dating of the unique prior (followed by the restriction to the one-step-ahead information).
Second, the one-step-ahead conditionals process is essentially unrestricted; boundedness
and compact-convexity are intrinsic to the Gilboa-Schmeidler ambiguity and measurability
is merely technical. For these reasons, Epstein and Schneider (2007) call the one-step-ahead
conditionals process “a natural vehicle for modelling learning dynamics.”
In this section, I explain how I model the agent’s learning dynamics. The proposed
6Many of the heuristic arguments such as those in this paragraph can be made more formal by introducing
infinitesimal generators. See Anderson et al. (2003).
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mechanism is closely related to Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) and it thus helps to briefly
review their model first.
1.3.1 Epstein and Schneider (2007)
Here I review Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) model of learning under ambiguity focusing
on their main example in which stock returns follow a binary process in discrete time.
Their model of stock returns formally corresponds to the robust Bernoulli model of
Walley (1991, Section 9.6). Begin with the standard, conditionally i.i.d. binary return
process. There is a stock for which there are d trading days per month. The likelihood
function for the net rate of return between two consecutive trading days is7
L
(
∆R(t) = ±σR/
√
d
∣∣∣ x¯) = 1
2
± 1
2
x¯
σR
√
d
where R denotes the cumulative return process and the implied monthly expected return x¯ ∈
R is unknown. A Bayesian agent would have a unique parameter prior M (the marginal a
priori distribution for the parameter x¯) and learning would amount to the Bayesian updating
ofM . Epstein and Schneider introduce ambiguity by generalizing the exchangeable Bayesian
model in the following way. First, there are multiple parameter priors. Second, there are
multiple stepwise likelihood functions
L
(
∆R(t) = ±σR/
√
d
∣∣∣ x¯, η(t)) = 1
2
± 1
2
x¯+ η(t)
σR
√
d
, |η(t)| ≤ η¯ (1.4)
for some η¯ <∞, so that at each trading date t, any value of η(t), |η(t)| ≤ η¯, could be the case.
Thus, the assumption of identical distributions is replaced by the weaker exchangeability
assumption of indistinguishable distributions (Epstein and Schneider, 2003a, 2007; Epstein
and Seo, 2010, 2011).
η(t) captures the factors of the data-generating mechanism the agent understands
poorly, no more than the bound |η(t)| ≤ η¯. Or an alternative interpretation is that the
agent doubts the assumption that the expected return is constant but is unable to formalize
7Epstein and Schneider consider log returns but the difference is inconsequential.
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it probabilistically. The key characteristics of the Walley-Epstein-Schneider generalization
are (i) η is nonparametric, that is, no connection of any sort is assumed between η(s) and
η(t), s 6= t, and (ii) {η(t)} are incidental (Neyman and Scott, 1948), that is, the sequence
η = {η(1), . . . , η(T )} grows with observation. Consequently, η is impossible to learn.
Based on the above generalization of the exchangeable Bayesian model, Epstein and
Schneider (2007) nonaxiomatically propose the following learning mechanism. Collect the
multiple parameter priors inM and the multiple stepwise likelihoods in L. M may consist
only of Dirac measures; to quote Epstein and Schneider, “Indeed, one may wonder whether
there is a need for non-Dirac priors at all.” Having observed the returns up to trading date
t > 0, the agent entertains all the data-generating mechanisms conceivable from the pair
(M,L), that is, M×Lt =M× (L × · · · × L). Each (M,Lt) ∈ M× Lt is called a theory.
Now, the agent rules out theories with low likelihood and Bayes-updates the remaining
ones to obtain the set of one-step-ahead conditionals: denoting the log-likelihood function
of theories by `t(M,L
t), the set of one-step-ahead conditionals is given by
{∫
L(·|x¯, η(t+ 1)) dMt(M,Lt) : |η(t+ 1)| ≤ η¯ and `t(M,Lt) ≥ max
(µ,λt)∈M×Lt
`t(µ, λ
t)− α
}
(1.5)
where Mt(M,L
t) denotes the posterior of x¯ obtained from (M,Lt) by Bayes’ rule and α ≥ 0
is a primitive. And from this, the set of priors is determined by backward induction.
1.3.2 Classical Updating Rule
Each theory defines a probability measure on the observation σ-algebra (the σ-algebra
generated by the return process). Note, however, that the set of the probability measures on
the observation σ-algebra implied by the theories are not necessarily the set of priors derived
from the theories by the learning mechanism described above; the former will typically be
smaller than the latter. This is the case even if α =∞ and no theories are discarded. That
is, if we elicit the beliefs of an agent who entertains multiple data-generating mechanisms
and at the same time behaves dynamically consistently in the sense of Epstein and Schneider
(2003b) and Wang (2003), then the elicited beliefs does not necessarily coincide with the
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beliefs the agent actually has regarding the data-generating mechanism. To quote Epstein
and Schneider (2003b),
P ′ [an arbitrary set of probability measures that is thought to model the agent’s
beliefs] induces sets of one-step-ahead conditionals and these generate P [the
set of priors] as described above. Because induced one-step-ahead conditionals
are precisely what one needs to compute utility by backward induction, we can
view P as precisely the enlargement of P ′ needed in order to incorporate the
logic of backward induction.
In unique-prior models, typically the two notions of a priori beliefs are considered, explicitly
or implicitly, one and the same.
Given the distinction, we may then speak of the updating of multiple theories. And
a natural way to learn under this interpretation, albeit not axiomatically incorporated to
recursive multiple-priors, is that of classical statistics: rule out theories with low likelihood
and update the remaining ones by Bayes’ rule. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) call this the
classical updating rule and axiomatize the extreme case, namely, the maximum-likelihood
classical updating rule. They show (i) it coincides with the pessimistic Bayesian updating
where the latter means that upon learning that an event A has occurred, the agent behaves
as if he believed that had A not occurred, the best possible outcome would have resulted,
and (ii) it is commutative in the sense that the conditional preferences given A∩B are the
same whether it is obtained sequentially conditioning on B after on A or at once on A∩B.
There are two differences between Epstein and Schneider (2007) and the present disser-
tation in terms of modeling learning under ambiguity. First, Epstein and Schneider focus
on memoryless theories (recall (1.5)), whereas I consider path-dependent theories. Indeed,
the classical updating rule, or any selection-rule-based learning mechanism in general, is
applicable to any set of theories. Second, Epstein and Schneider’s model is in discrete time,
whereas I set up a continuous-time model. It turns out that the last difference is nontrivial.
If we take the continuous-time limit of their return process first and then apply their learn-
ing mechanism, then there cannot be learning because the likelihood function of theories
10
degenerates to infinity everywhere. I turn to this point now.
1.3.3 Discrete Time versus Continuous Time
The continuous-time return process implied by (1.4) is
dR(t) = (x¯+ η(t)) dt+ σR dw(t) (1.6)
with |η(t)| ≤ η¯ for all t.8 The log-likelihood function of (x¯, η) is (see Proposition 1.3)
∫ T
0
(x¯+ η(t))σ−2R dR(t)−
1
2
∫ T
0
[σ−1R (x¯+ η(t))]
2 dt.
But the sequence {ην : ν = 1, 2, . . .} defined by
ην(t) ,

0 if t = 0
+η¯ if t ∈ (tνi , tνi+1] and R(tνi+1)−R(tνi ) > 0
−η¯ if t ∈ (tνi , tνi+1] and R(tνi+1)−R(tνi ) ≤ 0
where {tν1 , . . . , tνν} is the νth dyadic partition of [0, T ], will make the integral
∫ T
0 η
ν(t) dR(t)
diverge to the infinite variation of R.9 Epstein and Schneider could circumvent this problem
because the set of one-step-ahead conditionals (1.5) is well-defined for all trading frequencies
d and converges. But if time is continuous at the outset, such a circumvention is not possible.
To have a continuous-time model of learning under ambiguity, I relax the assumption
that the drift of the observable process is constant and let it be time-varying. Accordingly,
8Assume d→∞ and observe that the mean of the return is
x¯+ η
σR
√
d
σR√
d
=
x¯+ η
d
= (x¯+ η) dt
and that the variance of the return is(
σR√
d
− x¯+ η
d
)2(
1
2
+
1
2
x¯+ η
σR
√
d
)
+
(
− σR√
d
− x¯+ η
d
)2(
1
2
− 1
2
x¯+ η
σR
√
d
)
≈ σ
2
R
d
= σ2R dt.
9The discrete-time partial maximum-likelihood estimate also alternates between the extreme values ±η¯
and the corresponding profile likelihood function (the likelihood function with η replaced by the partial
maximizer) becomes degenerate as the trading dates become infinitely frequent. See Epstein and Schneider
(2007), Supplementary Appendix, Proposition S1.
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the agent now faces ambiguity regarding the dynamics of the hidden state. I show that in
this setup, a nondegenerate likelihood-ratio statistic can be defined.
1.4 The Theories
Denote the observable process that generates the agent’s information by y = {y(t),Gt}.
That is, G is the P 0-augmentation of the filtration generated by y. ny denotes the dimension
of y. Examples of y will be given shortly.
In this section, I define the theories that the agent entertains about how y is generated.
They are given by a set of probability measures Q ∈ Q on a common measurable space.
1.4.1 The Reference Likelihood
Let there be a filtration F = {Ft} on Ω and a probability measure Qx¯,0 on (Ω,FT ) where
x¯ ∈ Rnx , nx ≥ 1. F satisfies the usual conditions with respect to Qx¯,0. Let there also be two
independent Qx¯,0-Wiener processes w = {w(t),Ft} and vx¯,0 = {vx¯,0(t),Ft}, ny-dimensional
and nx-dimensional, respectively. Under Q
x¯,0, y satisfies the following system of SDEs:
dy(t) = (a(t, y) + b(t, y)x(t)) dt+ σ(t, y) dw(t)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv dvx¯,0(t).
Here, x = {x(t),Ft} is an nx-dimensional process that is unobservable to the agent;
a : [0, T ] × C([0, T ],Rny) → Rny , b : [0, T ] × C([0, T ],Rny) → Rny×nx , and σ : [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ],Rny)→ Rny×ny are nonanticipating path functionals where C([0, T ],Rny) denotes
the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] into Rny ;10 κx is an nx×nx diagonal matrix with
positive entries, ρw is an nx×ny matrix, and ρv is an nx×nx invertible matrix. Given that
y is observed, the diffusion matrix process σσ>, too, is observed via quadratic variation-
covariation. The assumption that σ as a nonanticipating path functional depends only on
y, or equivalently, σ as a process is adapted to G, embodies the restriction that observing
10Let ι be the canonical process on C([0, T ],Rny ); that is, ι(t, f) = f(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , f ∈ C([0, T ],Rny ).
Let Bt , σ(ι(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) and Bt+ , ∩s>tBs with BT+ , BT . a, b, and σ are measurable and adapted to
{Bt+}.
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the diffusion matrix does not expand the agent’s information. x(0) is an F0-measurable
random variable. The distribution of x(0) conditional on G0 is normal with mean m0 ∈ Rnx
and variance-covariance matrix γ0 ∈ Rnx×nx . For simplicity, I assume y(0) is nonrandom.
All the parameters and functional forms are known but x¯.
Example 1.1 (Stock Returns with Constant Volatility). Suppose that the cumulative re-
turn process R of a stock satisfies
dR(t) = x(t) dt+ σR dw(t)
and R is the only observable process. Then, y = R with a ≡ 0, b ≡ 1, and σ ≡ σR > 0.
Example 1.2 (Stock Returns with Stochastic Volatility). Suppose that the conditional
return variance follows a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process (Heston, 1993), that is,
dR(t) = x(t) dt+
√
A(t)(
√
1− r2RA, rRA) dw(t)
dA(t) = κA(A¯−A(t)) dt+ ςA
√
A(t)(0, 1) dw(t)
where rRA ∈ (−1, 1), κA > 0, A¯ ∈ R, and ςA > 0. Suppose also that R and A are the only
observable processes. Then, y = (R,A)> with
a(t, y) =
 0
κA(A¯−A(t))
 , b ≡
 1
0
 , and σ(t, y) = √A(t)

√
1− r2RA rRA
0 ςA
 .
Example 1.3 (Extra Signal). Suppose that the return volatility is constant as in Example
1.1 but now there is an extra signal about the hidden state x in addition to R (Detemple,
1986; Veronesi, 2000):
dR(t) = x(t) dt+ σR(
√
1− r2RA, rRA) dw(t)
dA(t) = x(t) dt+ σA(0, 1) dw(t)
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where rRA ∈ (−1, 1) and σR, σA > 0. Then, y = (R,A)> with
a ≡
 0
0
 , b ≡
 1
1
 , and σ ≡
 σR
√
1− r2RA σRrRA
0 σA
 .
Similar examples can be constructed in a general equilibrium setting in which, for example,
the aggregate consumption growth replaces the stock returns.
Now, the reference likelihood function of the unknown parameter x¯ under full observa-
tion, or simply the reference likelihood, is defined by
LFO,T (x¯) ,
dQx¯,0
dQ0,0
.
1.4.2 Bayesian (Unique-Prior) Benchmark
Let M be a probability measure on (Rnx ,BRnx). Then, (M,LFO,T ) defines a standard
Bayesian model where (M,LFO,T ) describes the data-generating mechanism according to
which x¯ is drawn from M and conditional on x¯ the law of (y, x) is given by LFO,T (x¯).
1.4.3 The Theories
Bayesian agents behave as if they knew the probabilities of all relevant events precisely. Con-
sider in contrast an agent who lacks confidence in his understanding of the data-generating
mechanism and finds both the parameter x¯ and the reference likelihood LFO,T ambiguous.
Specifically, the agent’s perception of ambiguity regarding x¯ is expressed by the multi-
plicity of parameter priors. For simplicity, I assume that the set of parameter priors consists
only of Dirac measures:
M = {Diracx¯′ : x¯′ ∈ Rnx}
where Diracx¯
′
denotes the Dirac measure concentrated at x¯′ ∈ Rnx .
Similarly, the agent also entertains multiple likelihoods. Fix x¯. Let there be a probability
measure Qx¯,η, η ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnx), on (Ω,FT ) where L2([0, T ],Rnx) denotes the set of square-
integrable, Rnx-valued functions. Let there also be an nx-dimensional Wiener process vx¯,η =
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{vx¯,η(t),Ft} independent of w. Under Qx¯,η, (y, x) satisfies the following system of SDEs:
dy(t) = (a(t, y) + b(t, y)x(t)) dt+ σ(t, y) dw(t) (1.7)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv( dvx¯,η(t) + η(t) dt) (1.8)
where, as before, y(0) ∈ Rny is nonrandom and the F0-measurable random variable x(0)
has the conditional distribution x(0)|G0 ∼ N(m0, γ0). The set of full-observation likelihood
functions is given by
LFO,T =
{
x¯ 7→ LFO,T (x¯, η) : η ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnx)
}
LFO,T (x¯, η) ,
dQx¯,η
dQ0,0
.
Compare this specification of multiple likelihoods with Epstein and Schneider’s (2007)
reviewed in Section 1.3.1, that is, (1.4) and (1.6). As with theirs, the current specification
(1.7)-(1.8) also incorporates the notion of indistinguishability; η is nonparametric and the
only restriction of square-integrability is global. But while in (1.6) the agent’s lack of
confidence is expressed as the ambiguity in the drift of the measurement error process, in
(1.7)-(1.8) it is expressed as the ambiguity in the drift of the unobservable process. To give
an alternative interpretation of η, we can rewrite (1.8) as
dx(t) = κx
(
x¯+ κ−1x ρvη(t)− x(t)
)
dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv dv
x¯,η(t).
That is, the agent lacks confidence in the time-invariance of the unconditional mean of x
and suspects the existence of a time-varying factor η that he cannot model probabilistically.
Now I turn to the issue of the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of
SDEs (1.7) and (1.8). | · | denotes the Euclidean norm for vectors and the Frobenius norm
for matrices; that is, for a vector or matrix z, |z| ,
√
tr(zz>). All numbered assumptions
stand throughout the dissertation from their statement on, unless otherwise noted.
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Assumption 1.1 (Sufficient Conditions for Unique Strong Existence). (i) b is uniformly
bounded.
(ii) For all f ∈ C([0, T ],Rny),
∫ T
0
(|a(t, f)|+ |σ(t, f)|2) dt <∞.
(iii) a, b, and σ are locally Lipschitz. That is, for each N there is a KN such that
(
sup
s≤t
|f(s)|
)
∨
(
sup
s≤t
|g(s)|
)
≤ N ⇒ |σ(t, f)− σ(t, g)| ≤ KN sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|
for all t ∈ [0, T ]; and the same for a and b mutatis mutandis.
(iv) a and σ are linearly growing. That is, there is a K such that
|a(t, f)|+ |σ(t, f)| ≤ K
(
1 + sup
t≤T
|f(t)|
)
for all (t, f) ∈ [0, T ]× C([0, T ],Rny).
Proposition 1.1. Strong existence and pathwise uniqueness hold for the system of SDEs
(1.7)-(1.8).
Suppose (w, vx¯,η) and (y, x) are defined on some filtered complete probability space.
With a slight abuse of notation, σ(t) ≡ σ(t, ω) ≡ σ(t, y(ω)). With the notation σ(t, ω), σ
can be considered a process (adapted to G). Similar remarks apply to the other functionals.
As is the custom, the qualification almost surely is suppressed unless necessary.
Assumption 1.2. There is an ε > 0 such that
z>σ(t)σ(t)>z ≥ ε|z|2 for all z ∈ Rny and all t ∈ [0, T ].
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Remark 1.1. The stochastic volatility model (Example 1.2) violates Assumption 1.2:
σ(t)σ(t)> = A(t)
 1 rRAςA
ςArRA ς
2
A

and the last matrix that post-multiplies A(t) satisfies Assumption 1.2,11 but A(t) may get
arbitrarily close to 0. In general, if Assumption 1.2 fails, then the subsequent findings based
on the assumption hold up to the random time
T ∧ inf
{
t > 0 : z>σ(s)σ(s)>z ≥ N−1|z|2 for all z ∈ Rny and all s ≤ t
}
.
Assumption 1.2 implies that σ(t) has an inverse and |σ(t)−1z| ≤ K−1/2|z| for all z ∈ Rny
and all t ∈ [0, T ]; likewise, σ(t)>, too, has an inverse and |(σ(t)>)−1z| ≤ K−1/2|z| for all
z ∈ Rny and all t ∈ [0, T ] (Karatzas and Shreve (1988), Problem 5.8.1). With the last
observation, we can rewrite (1.7) and (1.8) as
dw(t) = σ(t)−1[ dy(t)− (a(t) + b(t)x(t)) dt] (1.9)
dvx¯,η(t) = ρ−1v
{
dx(t)− κx(x¯− x(t)) dt− ρwσ(t)−1[ dy(t)− (a(t) + b(t)x(t)) dt]
}− η(t) dt
(1.10)
and use these SDEs to define w and vx¯,η.
Let
Ω , C([0, T ],Rny)× C([0, T ],Rnx)
11The question is if there is a (small) ε > 0 such that for all z = (z1, z2),
0 ≤ z21 + 2z1z2ςArRA + z22ς2A − ε(z21 + z22)
= (1− ε)
((
z1 +
z2ςArRA
1− ε
)2
−
(
z2ςArRA
1− ε
)2
+ z22
ς2A − ςA
1− ε
)
.
The last inequality holds for all z if and only if
ς2A(1− ε− r2RA) ≥ ε(1− ε).
Hence, the desired ε exists if and only if r2RA < 1, which is assumed.
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F◦ , BC([0, T ],Rny)⊗ BC([0, T ],Rnx),
let (y, x) be the identity map on Ω, and let
Qx¯,η , law(y, x)
be defined on (Ω,F◦). Let F = {Ft} be the augmented filtration generated by (y, x). Since
Qx¯,η, (x¯, η) ∈ Rnx ×L2([0, T ],Rnx), are equivalent, they all lead to the same augmentation.
Finally, define σ by σ(t, ω) = σ(t, y(ω)) and define w and vx¯,η by (1.9) and (1.10). In
particular, this construction (of weak solutions) explains why vx¯,η is superscripted.
In sum, the agent’s theories of how the data y is generated can be identified with the
probability measures
Q , {Qx¯,η : (x¯, η) ∈ Rnx × L2([0, T ],Rnx)}
on the common measurable space (Ω,FT ), all defined above. I call these probability mea-
sures data priors to distinguish them from the probability measures P ∈ P that are
part of the representation of the agent’s preferences, or the utility priors. Not only are
these two types of priors conceptually distinct, but they are different; we will see that
P * {Q|GT : Q ∈ Q} where Q|GT denotes the restriction of Q to GT .
1.5 The Utility Priors
1.5.1 Filtering
Recall the partially observable system
dy(t) = (a(t) + b(t)x(t)) dt+ σ(t) dw(t) (1.11)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv( dvx¯,η(t) + η(t) dt). (1.12)
I use the dot notation for the time derivatives: f˙(t) ≡ df(t)/dt.
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Proposition 1.2. The following standard results in Gaussian filtering hold:
(i) (y, x) is conditionally Gaussian.
(ii) The conditional mean vector and variance-covariance matrix
mx¯,η(t) , EQx¯,η(x(t)|Gt)
γ(t) , EQx¯,η [(x(t)−mx¯,η(t))(x(t)−mx¯,η(t))>|Gt]
satisfy the system of differential equations
dmx¯,η(t) = [κx(x¯−mx¯,η(t)) + ρvη(t)] dt
+ (ρwσ(t)
> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1[ dy(t)− (a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t)) dt]
= (κxx¯+ ρvη(t)− κ¯x(t)mx¯,η(t)) dt
+ (ρwσ(t)
> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1( dy(t)− a(t) dt)
(1.13)
γ˙(t) = ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v − κxγ(t)− γ(t)κx
− (ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)> (1.14)
with initial conditions mx¯,η(0) = m0 and γ(0) = γ0, where
κ¯x(t) , κx + (ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t).
(iii) the process w¯x¯,η = {w¯x¯,η(t),Gt} defined by
w¯x¯,η(t) ,
∫ t
0
σ(s)−1[ dy(s)− (a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s)) ds], 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is a Wiener process under Qx¯,η and generates G.
Lemma 1.1. γ is uniformly bounded.
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Let ϕ : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rnx×nx be the solution of
ϕ˙(t) = −κ¯x(t)ϕ(t), ϕ(0) = Inx
where Inx denotes the nx-dimensional identity matrix. ϕ(t) is invertible for all t ≥ 0.
Introduce the following notation: for functions f from [0, T ] into Rnx or into Rnx×nx , Φf
denotes the process defined by
Φf (t) , ϕ(t)
∫ t
0
ϕ(s)−1f(s) ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Now
mx¯,η(t) = ϕ(t)
{
m0 +
∫ t
0
ϕ(s)−1[(κxx¯+ ρvη(s)) ds
+(ρwσ(s)
> + γ(s)b(s)>)(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1( dy(s)− a(t) dt)]
}
= ϕ(t)m0 + Φ
κxx¯+ρvη(t)
+ ϕ(t)
∫ t
0
ϕ(s)−1(ρwσ(s)> + γ(s)b(s)>)(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1( dy(s)− a(t) dt). (1.15)
1.5.2 Likelihood of Theories
The log-likelihood function of theories under partial observation, that is, given GT , is
`T (x¯, η) , log
d(Qx¯,η|GT )
d(Q0,0|GT )
= log EQ
0,0
(
dQx¯,η
dQ0,0
∣∣∣∣GT) (1.16)
where Qx¯,η|GT denotes the restriction of Qx¯,η to GT . The choice of the reference, here
(x¯, η) = (0, 0), is irrelevant to likelihood ratios.
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Proposition 1.3.
`T (x¯, η) =
∫ T
0
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1 dy(t)
− 1
2
∫ T
0
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t)) dt
−
(∫ T
0
(a(t) + b(t)m0,0(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1 dy(t)
− 1
2
∫ T
0
(a(t) + b(t)m0,0(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(a(t) + b(t)m0,0(t)) dt
)
.
(1.17)
The log-likelihood function given Gt, t < T , is obtained by replacing the arbitrary time
horizon T with t:
`t(x¯, η) =
∫ t
0
(a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s))>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1 dy(s)
− 1
2
∫ t
0
(a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s))>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1(a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s)) ds+ ft
where ft is independent of (x¯, η).
Since mx¯,η(t) is linear in x¯, `t(x¯, η) is quadratic in x¯. `t(x¯, η) is also Gaˆteaux differen-
tiable with respect to η and the derivative is linear in η:
Lemma 1.2. The Gaˆteaux differential of `t(x¯, ·) at η ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnx) in the direction
h ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnx) is
∫ t
0
(
(ϕ(s)−1ρv)>
∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1
× [ dy(τ)− (a(τ) + b(τ)mx¯,η(τ)) dτ ]
)>
h(s) ds.
1.5.3 Learning
Recall the dynamics of the observable process
dy(t) = (a(t) + b(t)x(t)) dt+ σ(t) dw(t).
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If the agent were a Bayesian with unique (data and utility) prior Qx¯,0 ∈ Q,12 then
Bayesian updating would result in the filtered dynamics
dy(t) = (a(t) + b(t)mx¯,0(t)) dt+ σ(t) dw¯(t) (1.18)
where w¯, defined by (1.18), is a (Qx¯,0,G)-Wiener process, and his time-t decisions would
accordingly be based on the unique one-step-ahead conditional
dy(t)|Gt ∼ N
[
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,0(t)) dt, σ(t)σ(t)> dt
]
.13
On the other hand, our agent, being conscious of ambiguity, a priori entertains a set of
theories, {Qx¯,η : (x¯, η) ∈ Rnx × L2([0, T ],Rnx)}, and rules out some of them in light of
new evidence. Hence, unless he rules out all but one theory, the agent will have multiple
one-step-ahead conditionals of the form
dy(t)|Gt ∼ N
[
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t)) dt, σ(t)σ(t)> dt
]
(1.19)
where (x¯, η) runs over a set. Note that the ambiguity in the data-generating mechanism
boils down to that in the value of the conditional expectation of x(t) given Gt.
Penalized Likelihood-Ratio Test
The ambiguity as it is, however, is too large for there to be learning. To elaborate, define
the log-likelihood function induced by the transformation (x¯, η) 7→ mx¯,η(t) by
`t,m(t)(m) , sup
(x¯,η)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
{
`t(x¯, η) : m
x¯,η(t) = m
}
, m ∈ Rnx .
12Given that the ambiguity-averse agent under consideration is uncertain about the parameter x¯, a fair
comparison would require the Bayesian agent to be given a diffuse parameter prior. But the form of the
parameter prior is irrelevant to the point I am trying to make here, namely, unique versus nonunique one-
step-ahead conditionals.
13See Footnote 6.
22
Then, `t,m(t) is constant, the constant value lying in R ∪ {∞}; see the appendix to this
chapter. In other words, the conditional expectation of x(t) given Gt is not identified. The
reason is that each value of mx¯,η(t) can be supported equally well by some theory with a
large time-varying factor η.14
To strike a balance between the goodness of fit and the complexity of the model, I
penalize large deviations from the reference likelihood x¯ 7→ LFO,T (x¯). Specifically, I take as
the penalty the L2-norm of η:
`λt (x¯, η) , `t(x¯, η)−
λ
2
∫ t
0
|η(s)|2 ds
where λ ∈ (0,∞] measures the agent’s a priori confidence about the reference likelihood,
or loosely speaking, λ−1 ∈ [0,∞) measures the a priori ambiguity about the reference
likelihood. (The latter interpretation is loose because λ−1 is not a statistical index.) When
λ =∞, the set of theories reduces to {Qx¯,0 : x¯ ∈ Rnx} and the agent perceives no persistent
source of ambiguity; when λ is small, the agent fits the data with a large η with little
restraint. It is also worth noting that the L2-norm of η corresponds to the unconditional
Kullback-Leibler divergence between Qx¯,η and Qx¯,0:
DKL(Q
x¯,η‖Qx¯,0) , EQx¯,η log dQ
x¯,η
dQx¯,0
=
1
2
∫ T
0
|η(t)|2 dt.
In conclusion, I model that the agent entertains the following penalized likelihood func-
14Precisely speaking, the supremum is not attained, that is, there does not exist a maximum likelihood
estimate. Fix x¯ and suppose there is a partial maximizer η of the likelihood `t(x¯, η), 0 < t ≤ T , in
L2([0, T ],Rnx). Then it must satisfy, from Lemma 1.2,
0 = (ϕ(s)−1ρv)
>
∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1[ dy(τ)− (a(τ) + b(τ)mx¯,η(τ)) dτ ], 0 ≤ s ≤ t
but the constancy of the left-hand side and the unbounded variation of the right-hand side are incompatible.
It follows that for any given η, there is another η′ with higher likelihood.
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tions of the parameter x¯:
LλT =
{
x¯ 7→ exp `λT (x¯, η) : η ∈ L2([0, T ],Rnx)
}
.15
In this setup, a theory (x¯, η) is not discarded if and only if
`λt (x¯, η) ≥ max
(x¯′,η′)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
`λt (x¯
′, η′)− α (1.20)
where α ≥ 0. α measures how conservative the agent is in model selection. When α = 0, he
dogmatically believes in the theory with the highest penalized likelihood. As shall be seen,
the corresponding induced log-likelihood of the conditional expectation of x(t) given Gt
`λt,m(t)(m) , max
(x¯,η)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
{
`λt (x¯, η) : m
x¯,η(t) = m
}
, m ∈ Rnx
has a nonzero curvature (Lemma 1.6).
The idea of penalizing the likelihood was first discussed by Good and Gaskins (1971)
in the context of nonparametric density estimation. Green (1987) extended the idea to
semiparametric settings. In this non- or semi-parametric estimation context, Sobolev norms
of higher orders, as well as the L2-norm, are favored. But for us, imposing smoothness on η
would violate the indistinguishability assumption. In the context of model selection, Akaike
(1973) extended the maximum likelihood principle by proposing his celebrated criterion in
the form of penalized likelihood. Ever since, penalizing the likelihood has been a standard
method in information theory to strike a balance between the goodness of fit and the
complexity of the model; see Konishi and Kitagawa (2008). Fan and Peng (2004) consider a
penalized likelihood-ratio test in the presence of incidental parameters. Chen (1998), Chen
et al. (2001), and Li and Chen (2010) test mixture models with penalized likelihood.
Remark 1.2. There are two prominent alternatives to the L2-penalty.
15This simple characterization depends on the fact that the parameter priors are all Dirac. Note that
`T (x¯, η) is a shorthand for the log-likelihood of the theory (M, x¯ 7→ LFO,T (x¯, η)) where the parameter prior
M can be diffuse.
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The first is Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) L∞-constraint: ess supt≤T |η(t)| ≤ η¯. This
amounts to constraining instantaneous entropy rates point-by-point in time. While this is
sensible when the agent is looking forward and fears misspecification of the infinitesimal
future, in looking backward, it is not. What the agent tries to pin down here is the value
of mx¯,η(t), and with this regard, η(s), s ≤ t, having large values for a short period of time
has little significance.
The other is an L2-constraint:
∫ T
0 |η(t)|2 dt ≤ η¯T . Naturally, this is closely related to the
L2-penalty: First, the constraint is a penalty that is discontinuous. Second, the constraint
is the dual of the penalty in Lagrange’s theorem. The constant λ defines a shadow process
η¯λ = {η¯λt } that implies the same maximum likelihood estimates. And I note that the
penalized likelihood-ratio test with λ is more conservative than the constrained likelihood-
ratio test with η¯λ. That is,
`t(x¯, η) ≥ max
(x¯′,η′)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
`t(x¯
′, η′)− α and 1
2
∫ t
0
|η(s)|2 ds ≤ η¯λt
implies (1.20).
But compared to its penalty counterpart, the L2-constraint has the following drawbacks.
First, the sharp bounds seem to be at odds with the assumed a priori ignorance. Second,
if, as is natural, the time-t bound η¯t is lower than η¯T , then it implies that the agent has a
time-varying parameter set. For example, he deems η(s) =
√
2η¯T /T (1, 0, · · · , 0)>, s ≤ t,
implausible at time t but plausible at time T .
Maximum Penalized Likelihood Estimation
I will need the following facts to characterize the natural “center” of the set of priors.
The maximum penalized likelihood estimate (MPLE) of (x¯, η) at time t is defined as
(x¯∗t , η
∗
t ) , arg max
(x¯,η)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
`λt (x¯, η).
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The notion of the partial MPLE of η given x¯ will prove helpful:
η∗x¯,t , arg max
η∈L2([0,T ],Rnx )
`λt (x¯, η).
Clearly, η∗t = η∗x¯∗t ,t.
The first-order condition with respect to η (FOC(η)) is
λη(s) = (ϕ(s)−1ρv)>
∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1
× [ dy(τ)− (a(τ) + b(τ)mx¯,η(τ)) dτ ], 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
To write the solution of this integral equation, introduce the following notation. Let
χ(s) ,
 ρvρ>v κ¯x(s)>(ρvρ>v )−1 ρvρ>v b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)
λ−1Inx −κ¯x(s)

and let ψ be the matrix-valued process such that ψ(0) = I2nx and
ψ˙(s) = χ(s)ψ(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
ψ(s) is invertible for all s ≥ 0. Let ι1 , (Inx , 0)>, ι2 , (0, Inx)>, and Aij , ι>i Aιj for a
2nx × 2nx matrix A.
Lemma 1.3. For all t > 0, (i) ψ11(t) is invertible and (ii) ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v is symmetric
and positive definite.
Let also
Ψ(s) , ψ(s)
∫ s
0
ψ(τ)−1 dτ, 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
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Proposition 1.4 (Partial MPLE of η).
 λρvη∗¯x,t(s)
Φκxx¯+ρvη
∗¯
x,t(s)
 = ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1
×
(
ι>1 ψ(t)
∫ t
0
ψ(τ)−1ι1ρvρ>v b(τ)
>(σ(τ)>)−1 dw¯0,0(τ)−Ψ12(t)κxx¯
)
− ψ(s)
∫ s
0
ψ(τ)−1ι1ρvρ>v b(τ)
>(σ(τ)>)−1 dw¯0,0(τ) + Ψ(s)ι2κxx¯.
(1.21)
Hence, mx¯,η
∗¯
x,t(s) is linear in x¯ (recall (1.15)). Define θ(t) by
θ(t) , Ψ22(t)− ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1Ψ12(t) (1.22)
or
mx¯,η
∗¯
x,t(t) = m0,η
∗
0,t(t) + θ(t)κxx¯.
That is, θ(t) measures the sensitivity to κxx¯ of m
x¯,η(t) with η “profiled out.” Let Ix¯(t)
denote the observed Fisher information about x¯:
Ix¯(t) , − ∂
2
∂(κxx¯)2
`λt (x¯, η
∗
x¯,t)
∣∣∣∣
x¯=x¯∗t
.
Precisely speaking, Ix¯(t) is the information about κxx¯ but I adopt this slight abuse of
terminology because κx is known and the parameter of interest is clearly x¯.
Assumption 1.3. (i) nx ≤ ny.
(ii) b(t) is of full column rank (that is, nx) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 1.4.
Ix¯(t) =
∫ t
0
θ(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)θ(s) ds
and is invertible for all t > 0.
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FOC(x¯) is
0 =
∫ t
0
(b(s)ΦInx (s)κx)
>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1[ dy(s)− (a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s)) ds].
Proposition 1.5 (MPLE of x¯). For t > 0,
κxx¯
∗
t = Ix¯(t)−1
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)>)−1 dw¯0,η
∗
0,t(s).
Remark 1.3. Estimation is not defined at time 0, and consequently, neither is the time-0
decision making. This is natural. At time 0, the agent is in the state of sheer ignorance while
once the observable process y starts to wiggle, information thereafter accrues continuously.
The singularity at time 0 is not a problem because, as we will see, decision making is
well-defined for all t > 0. Nevertheless, I assume purely for the brevity of exposition that
the agent’s learning started prior to time 0 and all the statistics, including Ix¯(0) and x¯∗0,
have a definite, finite value at time 0. The differential dynamics I am about to characterize
determine their evolution from thenceforth. To maintain the convention that G0 is trivial,
I assume that all the G0-measurable variables are nonrandom constants.
The natural center of the time-t set of one-step-ahead conditionals is
dy(t)|Gt ∼ N
(
a(t) + b(t)mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) dt, σ(t)σ(t)> dt
)
.
This observation motivates us to define a process  = {(t),Gt} by
d(t) = σ(t)−1[ dy(t)− (a(t) + b(t)mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t)) dt], (0) = 0. (1.23)
To prove that there is a probability measure on (Ω,GT ) under which  is a Wiener
process, I first observe the dynamics of the statistics.
Proposition 1.6 (Dynamics of the MPLEs).
κx dx¯
∗
t = σx¯∗(t)
>b(t)>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t)
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dmx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) = κx(x¯
∗
t −mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t)) dt+ [ρwσ(t)
> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>](σ(t)>)−1 d(t) (1.24)
where
σx¯∗(t) , θ(t)Ix¯(t)−1
δ(t) , ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v + θ(t)σx¯∗(t)>
= ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v + σx¯∗(t)Ix¯(t)σx¯∗(t)>.
Note that δ is symmetric and positive definite. The following proposition closes the dynam-
ics:
Proposition 1.7.
θ˙(t) = Inx−{κx+[ρwσ(t)>+(γ(t)+δ(t)−θ(t)σx¯∗(t)>)b(t)>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)}θ(t), (1.25)
σ˙x¯∗(t) = Ix¯(t)−1 − {κx + [ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)}σx¯∗(t), (1.26)
d
dt
(Ix¯(t)−1) = −σx¯∗(t)>b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)σx¯∗(t),
δ˙(t) = σx¯∗(t) + σx¯∗(t)
> + λ−1ρvρ>v
+ (ρwσ(t)
> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)>
− κxδ(t)− δ(t)κx
− [ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1[ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>]>.
(1.27)
The Utility Priors
Assumption 1.4. θ, σx¯∗ and δ are uniformly bounded.
Here are simple example cases in which Assumption 1.4 holds:
Lemma 1.5. Suppose either: (i) σ and b are deterministic or (ii) σ, ρw, ρv, and b are
diagonal16 and there is an ε > 0 such that κ¯x = κx + (ρwσ
> + γb>)(σσ>)−1b ≥ εInx a.e.
Then Assumption 1.4 holds.
16In case nx 6= ny, the nx × ny matrix ρw, for example, is diagonal if ρijw = 0 for all i 6= j.
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Remark 1.4. Given that σ, ρw, ρv, and b are diagonal, there trivially is an ε > 0 such that
κ¯x > εInx a.e. if ρw = 0.
Proposition 1.8. There is a unique probability measure on (Ω,GT ), denoted by P 0, such
that P 0 ∼ (Q0,0|GT ) and  is a Wiener process under P 0. Also,  generates G.
Observe that under P ξ,
dy(t)|Gt ∼ N
(
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) + σ(t)ξ(t)) dt, σ(t)σ(t)> dt
)
.
Hence, the time-t set of one-step-ahead conditionals Ξ(t) is defined by
a(t) + b(t)mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) + σ(t)Ξ(t)
=
{
µ ∈ Rnx : `λt (x¯∗t , η∗t )− max
(x¯,η)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
{`λt (x¯, η) : a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t) = µ} ≤ α
}
where the maximum is defined to be −∞ when there does not exist (x¯, η) satisfying the
constraint. It turns out that δ(t) is the inverse of the observed Fisher information about
mx¯,η(t):
Lemma 1.6.
`λt (x¯
∗
t , η
∗
t )− max
(x¯,η)∈Rnx×L2([0,T ],Rnx )
{`λt (x¯, η) : mx¯,η(t) = m}
= `λt,m(t)(m
x¯∗t ,η∗t (t))− `λt,m(t)(m)
=
1
2
(m−mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t))>δ(t)−1(m−mx¯t,η∗t (t)), m ∈ Rnx .
Proposition 1.9.
σ(t)Ξ(t) = b(t)
{
∆m ∈ Rnx : 1
2
(∆m)>δ(t)−1∆m ≤ α
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (1.28)
The process Ξ = {Ξ(t),Gt} is uniformly bounded and compact-convex. If furthermore each
of the processes b and σ−1 is left- or right-continuous, then Ξ is progressive.
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Remark 1.5. For ξ(t) ∈ Ξ(t),
1
2
(σ(t)ξ(t))>(b(t)δ(t)b(t)>)+σ(t)ξ(t) ≤ α (1.29)
where (b(t)δ(t)b(t)>)+ denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse:
(b(t)δ(t)b(t)>)+ = b(t)(b(t)>b(t))−1δ(t)−1(b(t)>b(t))−1b(t)>.
But the converse is not true, that is, (1.29) does not imply ξ(t) ∈ Ξ(t).
With a slight abuse of notation, let ξ ∈ Ξ mean that ξ = {ξ(t),Gt} is progressive and
ξ(t, ω) ∈ Ξ(t, ω) a.e. The set of priors is given by
P =
{
P ξ : P ξ is a probability measure on (Ω,GT ), dP
ξ
dP 0
= Eξ(T ), ξ ∈ Ξ
}
.
1.6 Discussion
Assume throughout this section nx = 1. Still, the setup is general enough to encompass all
the examples given in Section 1.4.1.
1.6.1 Learning of x¯
Proposition 1.10. Suppose b>(σσ>)−1b is uniformly bounded below. Then, the agent
eventually learns the time-invariant factor x¯ in the sense that the confidence set shrinks to
a singleton as time goes to infinity at any significance level.
The question that naturally arises next is if x¯∗ converges. But, since convergence under a
probability measure does not imply convergence under another probability measure obtained
by a Girsanov change of measure (see Karatzas and Shreve (1988), p. 193), to answer this
question we need to take a stance on the true probability measure. Although my stance is
implicitly that not only the agent not know the true probability measure but he does not
purport, either, to have identified a set of probability measures (data priors) that includes
it, if need be the natural candidate for the true probability measure is a data prior Qx¯,0 ∈ Q
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of the agent (correct specification). It remains to be seen if x¯∗ converges under Qx¯,0.17
1.6.2 Comparison with the Classical Filter
The agent’s learning process is summarized by a finite-dimensional filter (Propositions 1.6
and 1.7). The key components of the filter are {mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t)} and δ. The MPLEmx¯∗t ,η∗t (t) of the
conditional expectation of the unobservable state x(t) is the agent’s benchmark estimate of
the latter, and I accordingly defined the reference utility prior P 0 to be the “concatenation”
of the one-step-ahead conditionals computed using the benchmark estimates (Equation
(1.23) and Proposition 1.8). The set P of utility priors is then given by a neighborhood of
P 0, reflecting the a posteriori ambiguity in the value of the conditional expectation of x(t),
or more fundamentally, in the data-generating mechanism. The set of alternative values of
the conditional expectation of x(t) that pass the penalized likelihood-ratio test is given by
an interval centered at the benchmark estimate mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) (Lemma 1.6 and Proposition 1.9).
The length of the interval is proportional to the square-root of δ(t). Hence, the latter, or
δ(t) itself, is a measure of the a posteriori ambiguity.
Remark 1.6. In general, that is, when nx ∈ N, the set of alternative values of the con-
ditional expectation of x(t) is given by an nx-dimensional hyper-ellipsoid centered at the
benchmark estimate mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t). The lengths of the principal axes of the hyper-ellipsoid are
proportional to the square-roots of the eigenvalues of δ(t).
Therefore, of prime interest is how mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) and δ(t) evolve. In what follows, I compare
the filtering equations (1.24) and (1.30) with the classical conditionally Gaussian filter
(Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Chapter 12).
17 ∆x¯∗(t) , x¯∗t − x¯ and ∆m∗(t) , mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t)−mx¯,0(t) satisfy
κx d∆x¯
∗ = σ>x¯∗b
>(σ>)−1( dw¯x¯,0 − σ−1b∆m∗ dt)
d∆m∗ = κx(∆x¯
∗ −∆m∗) dt+ δb>(σ>)−1 dw¯x¯,0 − (ρwσ> + (γ + δ)b>)(σσ>)−1b∆m∗ dt
and (∆x¯∗,∆m∗) converges in L2. But the difficulty is that σx¯∗ is square-integrable but not integrable. It is
not clear whether ∫ ∞
0
σ>x¯∗b
>(σσ>)−1b∆m∗ dt
is convergent or not. On the other hand, it is easy to see that x¯∗ is an L2-bounded continuous martingale
under P 0, and therefore, under P 0, limt→∞ x¯∗t exists by Doob’s martingale convergence theorem (Rogers
and Williams (1994), Theorem II.69.1).
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Let us begin with the unobservable process x:
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv( dvx¯,η(t) + η(t) dt)
d
dt
var(x(t)) = |ρw|2 + ρ2v︸ ︷︷ ︸
var( dx(t)|Ft)/ dt
−2κx var(x(t)).
The time-derivative of the unconditional variance of x(t) is the conditional variance of dx(t)
given Ft per unit time less the unconditional variance times the rate of reversion (times
two). This is intuitive. In particular, the unconditional variance is decreasing in the rate of
reversion because as the reversion term becomes dominant, x stays closer to the attractor
x¯.
Recall next the classical conditionally Gaussian filter (1.13) and (1.14), slightly rephrased
to facilitate the discussion:
dmx¯,η(t) = [κx(x¯−mx¯,η(t)) + ρvη(t)] dt+ [ρw + (σ(t)−1b(t)γ(t))>︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kalman gain
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight on the innovation
dw¯x¯,η(t)
γ˙(t) = |ρw|2 + ρ2v − 2κxγ(t)−
∣∣∣ρw + (σ(t)−1b(t)γ(t))>∣∣∣2︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight on the innovation squared
.
We revise mx¯,η(t) in consideration of two factors: (i) the estimation error and (ii) the
variation in x(t). First, the correction of the estimation error, +(σ(t)−1b(t)γ(t))> dw¯x¯,η(t),
is proportional to the innovation dw¯x¯,η(t). To understand, suppose ny = 1 and σ, b > 0.
Then, when, for example, the change in the observable variable exceeds what was expected,
it is likely that the old estimate of the growth rate is an underestimation and it thus needs
to be revised up. The multiplicative factor, or the Kalman gain, is increasing in the current
uncertainty γ(t) of x(t) (the less trustworthy the current estimate, the more weight given on
the new evidence) and is decreasing in the imprecision σ(t) of the signal (the less informative
the signal, the less weight given on the new evidence). Second, mx¯,η(t) as an estimate of x(t)
is also to be revised by +κx(x¯−mx¯,η(t)) dt+ ρw dw¯x¯,η(t), to account for the corresponding
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(unobservable) changes +κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) in x(t).
γ˙(t) is given by the analogue of ( d/dt) var(x(t)) less the weight on the innovation
squared. The last term means that uncertainty resolves more quickly when the new evidence
is taken more seriously. This is intuitive because if we consider the extreme case in which
the weight is exactly zero, then it is equivalent to the case in which there temporarily is no
signal ( dw¯x¯,η(t) = 0), in which case it is natural for the uncertainty to rise.
To be noted further is that while the motivation for the revision +ρw dw¯
x¯,η(t) is to
account for the state dynamics, in effect it acts as if it were a weight on the new evidence.
And when the signs of ρw and b differ (assume ny = 1), it can counteract the correction
of the estimation error, and consequently, the uncertainty γ may depend nonmonotonically
on the signal imprecision σ. To elaborate, suppose that the signs of ρw and b differ and
that σ is time-varying and is currently sufficiently large that the signal is noninformative
about vx¯,η but informative about w (limt→∞ γ(t) = ρ2v/(2κx)). If σ drops and the weight
on the innovation becomes exactly zero, then by way of the earlier reasoning, uncertainty
rises (limt→∞ γ(t) = (ρ2w +ρ2v)/(2κx)). When ρw and b have the same sign, the filter always
corrects the estimation error and the uncertainty resolves.
Recall finally the dynamics (1.24) and (1.30) of mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) and δ(t) under the reference
utility prior P 0, again slightly rephrased:
dmx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) = κx(x¯
∗
t −mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t)) dt+ {ρw + [σ(t)−1b(t)( γ(t) + δ(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimation uncertainty
)]>} d(t)
δ˙(t) =
∣∣∣ρw + (σ(t)−1b(t)γ(t))>∣∣∣2︸ ︷︷ ︸
var( dmx¯,η(t)|Gt)/ dt
−2κxδ(t)−
∣∣∣ρw + [σ(t)−1b(t)(γ(t) + δ(t))]>∣∣∣2︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight on the innovation squared
+ 2θ(t)Ix¯(t)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity about the time-invariant factor x¯
+ λ−1ρ2v︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity about the time-variant factor η
.
As with the Bayesian estimate mx¯,η(t), the ambiguity-averse agent’s estimate mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t),
too, is revised in consideration of the estimation error and the variation in x(t). But the
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difference is that now γ(t) is replaced by the sum of γ(t) and δ(t). The posterior variance
γ(t) is also known as the estimation risk in the literature (Kalymon, 1971; Barry, 1974;
Klein and Bawa, 1976, 1977) and represents the Bayesian uncertainty under each theory
that results because the agent cannot observe x(t) and consequently has to estimate it. On
the other hand, δ(t) represents the Knightian uncertainty that results because the agent
does not know which theory (data-generating mechanism) is correct and consequently has
to estimate it. Based on this parallelism, I call δ(t) the estimation ambiguity and the
sum γ(t) + δ(t) the estimation uncertainty. When the estimated theory is imprecise (large
δ(t)), or the posterior distribution of x(t) is diffuse under the theory (large γ(t)), or both,
the new evidence receives more weight. Note that this simple characterization of estimation
uncertainty relies on the assumption that the prior variance of x(0) is common to all theories;
otherwise, different theories would result in different levels of estimation risk.
δ˙(t) is given by the analogue of γ˙(t) plus terms accounting for the ambiguity in the
factors of the data-generating mechanism. First, the first three terms reflect the fact that δ
measures the imprecision in the estimation of mx¯,η, as opposed to that in the estimation of
x as does γ. To elaborate, the first term is the conditional variance of dmx¯,η(t) (given Gt)
per unit time as opposed to that of dx(t) (given Ft) per unit time, the parallelism between
the second terms is obvious, and the third term is the weight on the innovation squared
exactly as in γ˙(t). Next, the fourth term captures the current ambiguity in the estimated
value mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) of mx¯,η(t) due to that in the time-invariant factor x¯; recall that θ(t) is the
sensitivity to κxx¯ of m
x¯,η(t) with η profiled out and Ix¯(t) is the negative Hessian of the
profile likelihood of κxx¯. The fifth and last term captures the a priori ambiguity in the
time-variant factor η and sets the long-run level of δ as the fourth term vanishes as was
observed in Section 1.6.1. As the ambiguity regarding x¯ gets resolved, the agent’s lack of
confidence is what keeps the a posteriori ambiguity δ above zero: limt→∞ δ(t) = 0 if and
only if λ =∞.
Similar remarks apply to the dual role of the revision +ρw dw¯
x¯,η(t). In particular, the
a posteriori ambiguity δ may depend nonmonotonically on the signal imprecision σ (see
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Chapter 3). But this time, the dependence is subtler because the first term of δ˙(t) also
involves ρw.
1.6.3 Convergence to an IID Ambiguity
We have the following necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to an IID ambigu-
ity:
Proposition 1.11. Assume finite confidence λ < ∞ for nondegeneracy. Ξ converges to a
constant subset of Rny if and only if σ−1b converges to a constant vector in Rny .
Suppose σ−1b converges to a constant vector and denote the latter again by σ−1b.
Suppose further ny = 1 for simplicity. Then,
lim
t→∞ ξ¯(t)
2 = 2α
(√
(κx + σ−1bρw)2 + (1 + λ−1)(σ−1bρv)2
−
√
(κx + σ−1bρw)2 + (σ−1bρv)2
)
where Ξ(t) = [−ξ¯(t), ξ¯(t)]. Note that ξ¯(∞) ≡ limt→∞ ξ¯(t) is nonzero if and only if λ is
finite. Also, not surprisingly, it is increasing in α and decreasing in λ.
To see the dependence of ξ¯(∞) on other parameters, let
Y (t) ,
∫ t
0
σ(s)−1 dy(s)
and assume σ−1a is deterministic. Then,
dY (t) = σ(t)−1(a(t) + b(t)x(t)) dt+ dw(t)
and, denoting the asymptotic variability of Y by
VY , lim
t→∞
d
dt
Var(Y (t)),
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we can rewrite ξ¯(∞)2 as
ξ¯(∞)2 = 2α
(√
κ2xVY + λ
−1(σ−1bρv)2 −
√
κ2xVY
)
.
Thus, ξ¯(∞) is decreasing in κx and VY . This is intuitive. First, when κx is large, the
unobservable process stays close to its unconditional mean. Second, VY measures the vari-
ability of the unobservable process x relative to the measurement error w. In particular, the
last observation is in line with the following remark by Merton (1980): “Unless a significant
portion of the variance of the market returns is caused by changes in the expected return on
the market, it will be difficult to distinguish among different models for expected return.”
1.6.4 When x¯ is Known
Suppose x¯ is known. Then, σx¯∗ ≡ 0 and δ˙(t) becomes
δ˙(t) = λ−1ρvρ>v + (ρwσ(t)
> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)>
− κxδ(t)− δ(t)κx
− [ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1[ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>]>.
(1.30)
Now there is a simpler way to characterize δ:
δ(t) = γλ(t)− γ∞(t)
where γλ satisfies
γ˙λ(t) = ρwρ
>
w + (1 + λ
−1)ρvρ>v − κxγλ(t)− γλ(t)κx
− (ρwσ(t)> + γλ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γλ(t)b(t)>)>. (1.31)
(1.31) is the differential equation (1.14) that γ satisfies, with ρvρ
>
v replaced by (1+λ
−1)ρvρ>v .
Hence, in particular, γ∞ ≡ γ. In fact, γλ(t) is the posterior variance of xλ(t) where the
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hypothetical unobservable process xλ is defined by Q
x¯,0 and
dy(t) = (a(t) + b(t)xλ(t)) dt+ σ(t) dw(t) (1.32)
dxλ(t) = κx(x¯− xλ(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) +
√
1 + λ−1ρv dvx¯,0(t). (1.33)
A comparison of the filtering equations in Section 1.5.1 and those in 1.5.3 reveals that an
agent with α = 0, that is, an agent who at each instant dogmatically believes in the one-
step-ahead conditional implied by the benchmark data prior, is observationally equivalent
to the Bayesian agent whose beliefs are represented by Qx¯,0 and (1.32)-(1.33). In other
words, the effect of learning under ambiguity in this case is observationally equivalent to a
(subjective) increase in the volatility of the unobservable process.
1.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The local version of the Itoˆ existence-uniqueness result. See
Rogers and Williams (1994), Theorem V.12.1.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Under Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, the following theorems in
Liptser and Shiryaev (1977) hold: (i) follows from Theorem 12.6; (ii), from Theorem 12.7;
and (iii) from a multidimensional adaptation of Theorems 7.17 and 12.5.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Let f(t) = eκxtγ(t)eκxt. Then
f˙(t) = eκxt[ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v − (ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)>]eκxt.
Since (ρwσ
> + γb>)(σσ>)−1(ρwσ> + γb>)> is symmetric and positive semidefinite,
tr f(t) ≤ tr f(0) +
∫ t
0
tr(eκxt(ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v )e
κxt) dt.
It follows that the sum of the variances is bounded: supt≤T
∑
i γii(t) <∞. Since covariances
are bounded by variances, the claim follows.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3.18 Fix (x¯, η) ∈ Rnx × L2([0, T ],Rny). Let Q¯x¯,η be the measure
under which j and vx¯,η are independent Wiener processes where j is defined by dj(t) =
σ(t)−1 dy(t), j(0) = 0. Then
dQx¯,η
dQ¯x¯,η
= Λ(T )
Λ(t) , exp
(∫ t
0
[σ(s)−1(a(s) + b(s)x(s))]> dj(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
|σ(s)−1(a(s) + b(s)x(s))|2 ds
)
.
Let ψx¯,η(t, ·) denote the unnormalized density of x(t) given Gt under Qx¯,η, defined by
EQ¯
x¯,η
[Λ(t)f(x(t))|Gt] =
∫
X
f(x)ψx¯,η(t, x) dx
where X , Rnx , f denotes an arbitrary test function, and
∫
X
dx ≡
∫
R
· · ·
∫
R
dx1 · · · dxnx .
Since (y, x) is conditionally Gaussian,
ψx¯,η(t, x) = exp
(
ux¯,η(t)− 1
2
(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1(x−mx¯,η(t))
)
(1.34)
where ux¯,η(t) is independent of x. Now use Bayes’ rule to see
`T (x¯, η) = log E
Q¯x¯,η
(
dQx¯,η
dQ¯x¯,η
∣∣∣∣GT)− log EQ¯0,0 ( dQ0,0dQ¯0,0
∣∣∣∣GT)+ log EQ¯0,0 ( dQ¯x¯,ηdQ¯0,0
∣∣∣∣GT)
but the last term is 0 because under Q¯0,0, v0,0 and j are independent. Thus
`T (x¯, η) = log
∫
X
ψx¯,η(T, x) dx− log
∫
X
ψ0,0(T, x) dx
= ux¯,η(T )− u0,0(T )
and all boils down to computing ux¯,η(T ).
18I thank Professor Domenico Cuoco for this direct proof. Alternatively, we can differentiate (1.16) under
the integral sign and re-construct the log-likelihood function back.
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To compute it, I compare the ψx¯,η given in (1.34) with that as the solution to the Zakai
equation:
Lemma 1.7. ψx¯,η satisfies
dψx¯,η(t, x) = ψx¯,η(t, x)[σ(t)−1(a(t) + b(t)x)]> dj(t)− div[(κx(x¯−x) + ρvη(t))ψx¯,η(t, x)] dt
− ∂xψx¯,η(t, x)>ρw dj(t) + 1
2
tr[∂2xψ
x¯,η(t, x)(ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v )] dt (1.35)
with initial condition ψx¯,η(0, ·) ∼ N(m0, γ0).
Proof of Lemma 1.7. The derivation is standard; see, for example, Elliott and Krish-
namurthy (1997). First, differentiating Λ(t)f(x(t)) and then re-integrating the resulting
expression,
Λ(t)f(x(t)) = Λ(0)f(x(0)) +
∫ t
0
Λ(s)f(x(s))[σ(s)−1(a(s) + b(s)x(s))]> dj(s)
+
∫ t
0
Λ(s)∂f(x(s))>{[κx(x¯− x(s)) + ρvη(s)] ds+ ρw dj(s) + ρv dvx¯,η(s)}
+
1
2
∫ t
0
Λ(s) tr[∂2f(x(s))(ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v )] ds.
Take the conditional expectation under Q¯x¯,η given Gt:∫
X
f(x)ψx¯,η(t, x) dx =
∫
X
f(x)ψx¯,η(0, x) dx
+
∫ t
0
∫
X
f(x)[σ(s)−1(a(s) + b(s)x)]>ψx¯,η(s, x) dx dj(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
X
∂f(x)>[κx(x¯− x) + ρvη(s)]ψx¯,η(s, x) dx ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
X
∂f(x)>ρwψx¯,η(s, x) dx dj(s)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
∫
X
tr[∂2f(x)(ρwρ
>
w + ρvρ
>
v )]ψ
x¯,η(s, x) dx ds.
For the change in the order of the conditional expectation and the stochastic integral with
respect to j, see Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Theorem 5.14. Now, integration by parts
with respect to x completes the derivation.
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(Proof of the proposition continued.) From (1.34),
d logψx¯,η(t, x) = dux¯,η(t) + (x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1 dmx¯,η(t)
+
1
2
(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1γ˙(t)γ(t)−1(x−mx¯,η(t)) dt
− 1
2
tr[γ(t)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(ρwσ(t)> + γ(t)b(t)>)>] dt
On the other hand, computing the spatial derivatives of ψx¯,η using (1.34) and plugging
them to (1.35), we obtain another expression for dψx¯,η(t, x):
dψx¯,η(t, x)/ψx¯,η(t, x) = [σ(t)−1(a(t) + b(t)x) + ρ>wγ(t)
−1(x−mx¯,η(t))]> dj(t)
+ [(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1(κx(x¯− x) + ρvη(t)) + trκx] dt
+
1
2
(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1(ρwρ>w + ρvρ>v )γ(t)−1(x−mx¯,η(t)) dt
− 1
2
tr(γ(t)−1(ρwρ>w + ρvρ
>
v )) dt.
Then
d logψx¯,η(t, x) =
1
ψ
dψ +
1
2
(
− 1
ψ2
)
( dψ)2
= [σ(t)−1(a(t) + b(t)x) + ρ>wγ(t)
−1(x−mx¯,η(t))]> dj(t)
+ [(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1(κx(x¯− x) + ρvη(t)) + trκx] dt
+
1
2
(x−mx¯,η(t))>γ(t)−1(ρwρ>w + ρvρ>v )γ(t)−1(x−mx¯,η(t)) dt
− 1
2
tr(γ(t)−1(ρwρ>w + ρvρ
>
v )) dt
− 1
2
|σ(t)−1(a(t) + b(t)x) + ρ>wγ(t)−1(x−mx¯,η(t))|2 dt.
Equate the two expressions of d logψx¯,η(t, x) to see
dux¯,η(t) = −1
2
tr(γ(t)−1γ˙(t)) dt+ (a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1 dy(t)
− 1
2
(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t))>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1(a(t) + b(t)mx¯,η(t)) dt.
Finally, note that ux¯,η(0) = u0,0(0).
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Proof of Lemma 1.2. Let ε > 0 and observe
`t(x¯, η + εh)− `t(x¯, η) = ε
∫ t
0
(∫ s
0
ϕ(τ)−1ρvh(τ) dτ
)>
ϕ(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1 dy(s)
− ε
∫ t
0
(a(s) + b(s)mx¯,η(s))>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ϕ(s)
∫ s
0
ϕ(τ)−1ρvh(τ) dτ ds+O(ε2).
(1.36)
The first term can be rewritten, by integration by parts, as
ε
(∫ t
0
ϕ(τ)−1ρvh(τ) dτ
)> ∫ t
0
ϕ(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1 dy(s)
− ε
∫ t
0
(ϕ(s)−1ρvh(s))>
∫ s
0
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1 dy(τ) ds
= ε
∫ t
0
(∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1 dy(τ)
)>
ϕ(s)−1ρvh(s) ds
(1.37)
and the second term, by changing the order of integration, as
ε
∫ t
0
(∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1(a(τ) + b(τ)mx¯,η(τ)) dτ
)>
ϕ(s)−1ρvh(s) ds. (1.38)
Now, plug (1.37) and (1.38) into (1.36), differentiate it with respect to ε, and set ε = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Since ψ11(0) = Inx , ψ11(t) is by continuity invertible up to a
random time τ11 ∈ (0, T ]. Up to τ11, ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v satisfies
f˙(t) = λ−1ρvρ>v −κ¯x(t)f(t)−f(t)κ¯x(t)>−f(t)b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)f(t), f(0) = 0. (1.39)
(1.39) has a unique solution: suppose p and q solve (1.39), let ∆(t) = p(t)−q(t), and observe
∆(0) = ∆˙(0) = 0. Thus, ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v is symmetric up to τ11.
Consider the following hypothetical partially observable system
dy(t) = b(t)x(t) dt+ σ(t) dw(t)
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dx(t) = −κ¯x(t)x(t) dt+ λ−1/2ρv dv(t), x(0) ∼ N(m0, 0)
with the understanding κ¯x(t) = κ¯x(t, y). By Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Theorem 12.7,
the conditional variance of x(t) satisfies (1.39) and stays positive definite for t > 0. (The
assumptions of the theorem are satisfied; in particular, κ¯x is uniformly bounded by Lemma
1.1.) Hence, ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v is positive definite and consequently invertible up to τ11.
Since ψ21(0) = 0 and ψ˙21(0) = λ
−1In, ψ21(t), t > 0, too, is invertible up to a random
time τ21 ∈ (0, T ]. By the last paragraph, τ21 ≥ τ11.
Suppose τ11 < T . There are two cases to consider. First, τ11 = τ21. This contradicts
the invertibility of ψ. Second, τ11 < τ21. Then ψ11(t)
−1 will explode as t ↑ τ11, which
is impossible because ψ21(t) is invertible. To be concrete, let g be the solution of g˙(t) =
g(t)κ¯x(t), g(0) = In, and let h(t) , g(t)ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v g(t)>. Observe
trh(t) ≤
∫ T
0
tr(g(s)λ−1ρvρ>v g(s)
>) ds, t ≤ τ11,
Given that g and ψ21 are invertible, the left-hand side should explode as t ↑ τ11 but the
right-hand side is finite. Hence, τ11 = τ21 = T . (Note. T is arbitrary.)
Proof of Proposition 1.4. Multiply ρv to FOC(η) to have
λρvη(s) = ρvρ
>
v (ϕ(s)
−1)>
∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1[ dy(τ)− (a(τ) + b(τ)mx¯,η(τ)) dτ ].
Differentiate this with respect to s to see
d(λρvη(s)) = ρvρ
>
v κ¯x(s)
>(ρvρ>v )
−1λρvη(s) ds
− ρvρ>v b(s)>(σ(s)>)−1 dw¯0,0(s) + ρvρ>v b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)Φκxx¯+η(s) ds.
Observe in turn that
dΦκxx¯+ρvη(s) = −κ¯x(s)Φκxx¯+ρvη(s) ds+ (κxx¯+ ρvη(s)) ds
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and that consequently we have a linear system of differential equations in λρvη and Φ
κxx¯+ρvη.
Written in the matrix form, the system is
d
 λρvη(s)
Φκxx¯+ρvη(s)
 = χ(s)
 λρvη(s)
Φκxx¯+ρvη(s)
 ds+
 −ρvρ>v b(s)>(σ(s)>)−1 dw¯0,0(s)
κxx¯ ds

It follows λρvη(s)
Φκxx¯+ρvη(s)
 = ψ(s)
ι1λρvη(0) + ∫ s
0
ψ(τ)−1
 −ρvρ>v b(τ)>(σ(τ)>)−1 dw¯0,0(τ)
κxx¯ dτ


= ψ(s)ι1λρvη(0)
− ψ(s)
∫ s
0
ψ(τ)−1ι1ρvρ>v b(τ)
>(σ(τ)>)−1 dw¯0,0(τ) + Ψ(s)ι2κxx¯.
Finally, observe
λρvη(t) = 0
= ψ11(t)λρvη(0)
− ι>1 ψ(t)
∫ t
0
ψ(τ)−1ι1ρvρ>v b(τ)
>(σ(τ)>)−1 dw¯0,0(τ) + Ψ12(t)κxx¯.
Lemma 1.8. θ is the unique solution of
f˙(t) = Inx − κ¯λx(t)f(t), f(0) = 0 (1.40)
where
κ¯λx(t) , κ¯x(t) + ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)
= κx + [ρwσ(t)
> + (γ(t) + ψ21(t)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v )b(t)
>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t).
Proof. (1.40) follows from the direct differentiation of the definition. Uniqueness is stan-
dard.
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Define
p(s, t) , Ψ(s)ι2 − ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1Ψ12(t), s ≤ t ≤ T.
Then  λρvη∗¯x,t(s)
Φκxx¯+ρvη
∗¯
x,t(s)
 =
 λρvη∗0,t(s)
Φ0+ρvη
∗
0,t(s)
+ p(s, t)κxx¯, s ≤ t ≤ T
and ι>2 p(t, t) = θ(t). Also,
∂
∂t
p(s, t) = −ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t).
Proof of Lemma 1.4. Let
M(s) ,
 λ−1(ρvρ>v )−1 0
0 b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)

and observe
Ix¯(t) =
∫ t
0
p(s, t)>M(s)p(s, t) ds.
Thus
d
dt
Ix¯(t) = θ(t)>b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t)
− 2
∫ t
0
p(s, t)>M(s)ψ(s)ι1 dsψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f(t)
b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t),
f˙ = −f(κ¯x + ψ21ψ−111 ρvρ>v b>(σσ>)−1b)> + θ>b>(σσ>)−1b
ψ21ψ−111 ρvρ>v
−
∫ t
0
(ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v )
>M(s)ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(t)
 , (1.41)
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g˙ = λ−1ρvρ>v − κ¯xg − gκ¯>x − ψ21ψ−111 ρvρ>v b>(σσ>)−1bg
+ (ψ21ψ
−1
11 ρvρ
>
v − g)b>(σσ>)−1bψ21ψ−111 ρvρ>v
with f(0) = g(0) = 0, where I have suppressed t unless needed. g = ψ21ψ
−1
11 ρvρ
>
v is the
unique solution to the last equation. In turn, f = 0 is the unique solution to (1.41).
Suppose Ix¯(t) is singular for some t > 0. Since it is symmetric and positive semidefinite,
there must be a nonzero z ∈ Rnx such that
∫ t
0
z>θ(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)θ(s)z ds = 0
or σ(s)−1b(s)θ(s)z = 0 for Lebesgue almost every s ≤ t or θ(s)z = 0 for all s ≤ t. Multiply
z to (1.40) to see
d
ds
(θ(s)z) = 0 = z, s ≤ t
which is absurd.
Lemma 1.9.
ΦInx (t)> −
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ψ21(s) dsψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v = θ(t)
> (1.42)
and ∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ι>2 p(s, t) ds = Ix¯(t). (1.43)
Proof. (1.42): Denote the left-hand side by f(t). Then
f˙ = −(ΦInx )>κ¯>x + Inx − (ΦInx )>b>(σσ>)−1bψ21ψ−111 ρvρ>v
+
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ψ21(s) dsψ−111 ρvρ
>
v (κ¯
>
x + b
>(σσ>)−1bψ21ψ−111 ρvρ
>
v ).
(1.44)
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But by Lemma 1.8(i),
κ¯>x + b
>(σσ>)−1bψ21ψ−111 ρvρ
>
v = (κ¯x + ψ21ψ
−1
11 ρvρ
>
v b
>(σσ>)−1b)>
= (κ¯λx)
>
and with this, (1.44) can be rewritten as f˙ = Inx − f(κ¯λx)>, which is also satisfied by θ>.
Since f(0) = θ(0)> = 0, it follows that f(t) = θ(t)>.
(1.43): Denote the left-hand side by g(t). Then
g˙(t) = ΦInx (t)>b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t)
+
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)
∂
∂t
ι>2 p(s, t) ds
and that
∂
∂t
ι>2 p(s, t) = −ψ21(s)ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t).
By (1.42),
g˙(t) = θ(t)>b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)θ(t).
Note finally that g(0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. From FOC(x¯),
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ι>2 p(s, t) ds κxx¯
=
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)>)−1 dw¯0,η
∗
0,t(s).
Recall (1.43).
Proof of Proposition 1.6. (i) Differentiating FOC(x¯) with respect to t, we see
0 = ΦInx (t)>b(t)>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t)−
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s) dtΦκxx¯
∗
t+ρvη
∗
t (s) ds.
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Direct computation shows
dtΦ
κxx¯∗t+ρvη∗t (s) = ι>2 p(s, t)κx dx¯
∗
t + ψ21(s)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v b(t)
>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t). (1.45)
Hence,
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ι>2 p(s, t) ds κx dx¯
∗
t
=
(
ΦInx (t)> −
∫ t
0
ΦInx (s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ψ21(s) dsψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v
)
× b(t)>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t).
Use Lemma 1.9.
(ii) Observe
dmx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) = dmx¯,η(t)|x¯=x¯∗t ,η=η∗t + Φκx dx¯
∗
t+ρv dη
∗
t (t)
= κx(x¯
∗
t −mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t)) dt+ (ρwσ(t)
> + γ(t)b(t)>)(σ(t)>)−1 d(t)
+ Φκx dx¯
∗
t+ρv dη
∗
t (t).
dΦκxx¯
∗
t+ρvη
∗
t (t) is, if computed from the definition,
dΦκxx¯
∗
t+ρvη
∗
t (t) = −κ¯x(t)Φκxx¯∗t+ρvη∗t (t) dt+ κxx¯∗t dt+ Φκx dx¯
∗
t+ρv dη
∗
t (t)
and is, if computed from the solution (1.21) (recall (1.45)),
dΦκxx¯
∗
t+ρvη
∗
t (t) = −κ¯x(t)Φκxx¯∗t+ρvη∗t (t) dt+ κxx¯∗t dt
+ ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v b(t)
>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t) + θ(t)κx dx¯∗t .
Comparing the last two equations, we see
Φκx dx¯
∗
t+ρv dη
∗
t (t) = (ψ21(t)ψ11(t)
−1ρvρ>v + θ(t)σx¯∗(t)
>)b(t)>(σ(t)>)−1 d(t).
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Proof of Proposition 1.7. All follow from direct differentiation.
Proof of Lemma 1.5. (i) If σ and b are deterministic, then θ, σx¯∗ , and δ, too, are
deterministic. Since the latter are continuous, boundedness follows.
(ii) Suppose σ, ρw, ρv, and b are diagonal; it then suffices to consider the scalar case.
Suppose also κ¯x ≥ ε a.e. for some ε > 0.
Since δ − θσx¯∗ = ψ21ψ−111 ρ2v > 0,
θ˙(t) < 1− εθ(t) for all t ≥ 0.
Consider θ† defined by θ˙†(t) = 1−εθ†(t) and θ†(0) = θ(0). θ(t) ≤ θ†(t) for all t ≥ 0 because
θ(t) = θ†(t) implies θ˙(t) < θ˙†(t). Now, θ† monotonically converges to ε−1, and thus, θ is
uniformly bounded by ε−1 ∨ θ(0). Next, since I−1x¯ is decreasing,
σ˙x¯∗(t) < Ix¯(0)−1 − εσx¯∗(t)
and σx¯∗ is uniformly bounded by (εIx¯(0))−1 ∨ σx¯∗(0). Note, finally, that
δ˙(t) < 2[(εIx¯(0))−1 ∨ σx¯∗(0)] + λ−1ρ2v − 2εδ(t).
Remark 1.7 (Sharpening of the Bound θ ≤ ε−1 ∨ θ(0)). First, θ ≤ ε−1 because θ starts
from 0 (at some suppressed time prior to time 0). Second,
θ ≤ inf{ε−1 : κ¯x ≥ ε a.e.}
=
1
ess inf κ¯x
.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. Since
d(t) = dw¯0,0(t)− σ(t)−1b(t)(mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t)−m0,0(t)) dt,
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the question is whether
Eσ−1b∆(t) = exp
(∫ t
0
σ(s)−1b(s)∆(s) dw¯0,0(t)− 1
2
∫ t
0
|σ(s)−1b(s)∆(s)|2 ds
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is a martingale under Q0,0|GT , where
∆(t) , mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t)−m0,0(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Observe
d∆(t) = κx(x¯
∗
t −∆(t)) dt+ δ(t)b(t)>(σ(t)>)−1 dw¯0,0(t)
− [ρwσ(t)> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>](σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)∆(t) dt.
Hence, (∆, x¯∗) satisfies a linear SDE with uniformly bounded volatility. Thus, by a mul-
tidimensional adaptation of Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Theorem 4.7, there is an h > 0
such that supt≤T E
Q0,0 exp(h|∆(t)|2) < ∞; in turn, by the uniform boundedness of σ−1b,
there is an h′ > 0 such that supt≤T E
Q0,0 exp(h′|σ(t)−1b(t)∆(t)|2) < ∞. Now, by Liptser
and Shiryaev (1977), Section 6.2.3, Example 3, Novikov’s condition holds and Eσ−1b∆ is a
martingale. Define P 0 by dP 0/ d(Q0,0|GT ) = Eσ
−1b∆(T ).
Denote by F¯ the augmented filtration generated by . From the definition of , we have
F¯ t ⊆ Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . For the other direction, observe the SDE that (y,mx¯
∗· ,η∗· (·), x¯∗) satisfies
with a, b, σ, γ, δ, and σx¯∗ replaced by their respective nonanticipating path functionals in
y. The drift is locally Lipschitz and linearly growing, and the volatility is linearly growing
(Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4). Hence, if in addition (γ+δ)b>(σ>)−1 and σ>¯x∗b>(σ>)−1 are
locally Lipschitz, then (y,mx¯
∗· ,η∗· (·), x¯∗) is the unique strong solution to the SDE by Itoˆ’s
existence and uniqueness theorem (Rogers and Williams (1994), Theorem V.12.1), and it
would follow that F¯ t ⊇ Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , or F¯ = G. (Recall that I assume all G0-measurable
variables to be nonrandom constants.)
Since γ, δ, b>, (σ>)−1, and σ>¯x∗ are uniformly bounded, it suffices to show that each of
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them is locally Lipschitz: suppose p and q are matrix-valued path functionals on [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ],Rny). Then
|p(t, f)q(t, f)− p(t, g)q(t, g)| = |pq − pq′ + pq′ − p′q′|, p ≡ p(t, f) and p′ ≡ p(t, g)
≤ |p||q − q′|+ |q′||p− p′|
by the triangle and Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities.
γ is locally Lipschitz by the proof of Liptser and Shiryaev (1977), Theorem 12.5. b is so
by assumption (Assumption 1.1). To see σ−1 is locally Lipschitz, observe that
|σ(t, f)−1 − σ(t, g)−1| = |σ(t, f)−1(σ(t, g)− σ(t, f))σ(t, g)−1|
≤ |σ(t, f)−1||σ(t, g)−1||σ(t, g)− σ(t, f)|.
It remains to show that δ and σx¯∗ are locally Lipschitz. Let N > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], and let
f, g ∈ C([0, T ],Rny) be such that
(
sup
s≤t
|f(s)|
)
∨
(
sup
s≤t
|g(s)|
)
≤ N.
Consider I−1x¯ . Since
d
dt
(Ix¯(t)−1) = −σx¯∗(t)>b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)σx¯∗(t),
for s ≤ t,
|Ix¯(s, f)−1 − Ix¯(s, g)−1| ≤ K1
∫ s
0
|σx¯∗(τ, f)− σx¯∗(τ, g)|dτ +K2 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|
where I use the same symbols for the path functionals and Ki are positive constants that
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do not depend on s or t. Proceeding similarly for σx¯∗ , and using the last inequality,
|σx¯∗(s, f)− σx¯∗(s, g)| ≤ K3
∫ s
0
|σx¯∗(τ, f)− σx¯∗(τ, g)| dτ
+K4
∫ s
0
|δ(τ, f)− δ(τ, g)| dτ +K5 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|.
In turn,
|δ(s, f)− δ(s, g)| ≤ K6
∫ s
0
|δ(τ, f)− δ(τ, g)|dτ +K7 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|.
By Gronwall’s lemma,
|δ(s, f)− δ(s, g)| ≤ eK6sK7 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|, s ≤ t
or
|δ(t, f)− δ(t, g)| ≤ eK6TK7 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)| =: K8 sup
s≤t
|f(s)− g(s)|
where K8 does not depend on t. Hence δ is locally Lipschitz. In turn, so is σx¯∗ .
Proof of Lemma 1.6. Let
ft(∆x¯,∆η) , `λt (x¯∗t , η∗t )− `λt (x¯∗t + ∆x¯, η∗t + ∆η) ≥ 0
=
1
2
∫ t
0
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s) dt
+
λ
2
∫ t
0
|∆η(s)|2 ds
where I have recalled the FOCs. We are to find
min
∆x¯,∆η
{
ft(∆x¯,∆η) : Φ
κx∆x¯+ρv∆η(t) = ∆m
}
where ∆m ≡ m−mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t). Note that there always is a ∆x such that (∆x,∆η = 0) satisfies
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the constraint; Φκx(t) is invertible. Write the Lagrangian as
ft(∆x¯,∆η)− Λ>(Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(t)−∆m);
the dependence of Λ on t is suppressed. FOC(∆η) is
0 = (ϕ(s)−1ρv)>
∫ t
s
ϕ(τ)>b(τ)>(σ(τ)σ(τ)>)−1b(τ)Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(τ) dτ
+ λ∆η(s)− (Λ>ϕ(t)ϕ(s)−1ρv)>
or, multiplied by ρv and differentiated with respect to s,
d
ds
(λρv∆η(s)) = ρvρ
>
v κ¯x(s)
>(ρvρ>v )
−1λρv∆η(s)
+ ρvρ
>
v b(s)
>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s).
Proceeding similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.4,
 λρv∆η(s)
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)
 = ψ(s)ι1λρv∆η(0) + Ψ(s)ι2κx∆x¯.
Let s = t to obtain λρv∆η(t) = ψ11(t)λρv∆η(0) + Ψ12(t)κx∆x¯. From FOC(η),
0 = λ∆η(t)− (Λ>ρv)>.
Thus  λρv∆η(s)
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)
 = p(s, t)κx∆x¯+ ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v Λ. (1.46)
Now, FOC(∆x¯) is
0 =
(∫ t
0
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)>b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)ΦInx (s)κx ds
)>
− (Λ>ΦInx (t)κx)>.
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Substitute Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s) with that in (1.46) and use Lemma 1.9 to see κx∆x¯ = σx¯∗(t)
>Λ.
Plug this back to (1.46) and set s = t; the constraint is Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(t) = δ(t)Λ = ∆m or
Λ = δ(t)−1∆m.
Thus  λρv∆η(s)
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)
 = (p(s, t)σx¯∗(t)> + ψ(s)ι1ψ11(t)−1ρvρ>v )δ(t)−1∆m.
Observe
ft(∆x¯,∆η) =
1
2
∫ t
0
 λρv∆η(s)
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)

>
M(s)
 λρv∆η(s)
Φκx∆x¯+ρv∆η(s)
 ds
where
M(s) =
 λ−1(ρvρ>v )−1 0
0 b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)

as defined in the proof of Lemma 1.4. Proceeding similarly to that proof, we prove
ft(∆x¯,∆η) =
1
2
(∆m)>δ(t)−1∆m.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. Suppose first ξ(t) ∈ Ξ(t). Then b(t)mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t) + σ(t)ξ(t) =
b(t)mx¯,η(t) for some theory (x¯, η) and the theory passes the penalized likelihood-ratio test.
By Lemma 1.6,
1
2
(mx¯,η(t)−mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t))>δ(t)−1(mx¯,η(t)−mx¯∗t ,η∗t (t)) ≤ `λt (x¯∗t , η∗t )− `λt (x¯, η) ≤ α.
Suppose next σ(t)ξ(t) = b(t)∆m, ∆m ∈ Rnx , and 2−1(∆m)>δ(t)−1∆m ≤ α. Let
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∆x¯ , Φκx(t)−1∆m. Then
b(t)mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) + σ(t)ξ(t) = b(t)mx¯
∗
t+∆x¯,η
∗
t (t).
There is a theory (x¯, η) such that it passes the penalized likelihood-ratio test and
b(t)mx¯,η(t) = b(t)mx¯
∗
t+∆x¯,η
∗
t (t),
because
`λt (x¯
∗
t , η
∗
t )−maxx¯,η {`
λ
t (x¯, η) : b(t)m
x¯,η(t) = b(t)mx¯
∗
t+∆x¯,η
∗
t (t)}
= `λt (x¯
∗
t , η
∗
t )−maxx¯,η {`
λ
t (x¯, η) : m
x¯,η(t) = mx¯
∗
t+∆x¯,η
∗
t (t)}
=
1
2
(∆m)>δ(t)−1∆m ≤ α
where the second equality follows from Lemma 1.6.
Hence (1.28).
Since δ is uniformly bounded, so are its eigenvalues; hence, the eigenvalues of δ−1 are
uniformly bounded below away from 0. It follows that the right-hand side of (1.28) is
uniformly bounded; so is Ξ by Assumption 1.2. Compact-convexity is clear. Finally, pro-
gressive measurability is proved as that of a single-valued, left- or right-continuous adapted
process is proved: Suppose b and σ−1 are both right-continuous. Let {sνi : i} denote the
νth dyadic partition of [0, t], t ≤ T , and define δ−1ν by δ−1ν (s) , δ(sνi+1)−1 for sνi < s ≤ sνi+1
and δ−1ν (0) , δ(0)−1; define bν and σ−1ν in the same way. Let F be a closed subset of Rny
and observe that the weak inverse (Aliprantis and Border (1999), Section 16.1) is
{
(s, ω) ∈ [0, t]× Ω : σ−1ν (s, ω)b(s, ω)
{
∆m ∈ Rnx : 1
2
(∆m)>δ−1ν (s, ω)∆m ≤ α
}
∩ F 6= ∅
}
which is trivially B[0, t] ⊗ Gt-measurable. Now, note that δ−1 is differentiable and hence a
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fortiori continuous. We have δ−1∞ = δ−1 as well as b∞ = b and σ−1∞ = σ−1. Finally,
{
(s, ω) : σ(s, ω)−1b(s, ω)
{
∆m :
1
2
(∆m)>δ(s, ω)−1∆m ≤ α
}
∩ F 6= ∅
}
=
{
(s, ω) : ∩∞µ=1 ∪∞ν=µ σ−1ν (s, ω)bν(s, ω)
{
∆m :
1
2
(∆m)>δ−1ν (s, ω)∆m ≤ α
}
∩ F 6= ∅
}
= ∩∞µ=1 ∪∞ν=µ
{
(s, ω) : σ−1ν (s, ω)bν(s, ω)
{
∆m :
1
2
(∆m)>δ−1ν (s, ω)∆m ≤ α
}
∩ F 6= ∅
}
∈ B[0, t]⊗ Gt.
Proof of Proposition 1.10. The implied confidence set for x¯ is the projection onto
R 3 x¯ of the set of theories that pass the penalized likelihood-ratio test. It equals the
likelihood-ratio set based on the profile penalized likelihood, which is
{
x¯ ∈ R : `λt (x¯∗t , η∗x¯∗t ,t)− `
λ
t (x¯, η
∗
x¯,t) ≤ α
}
= x¯∗t +
{
∆x¯ ∈ R : 1
2
Ix¯(t)(κx∆x¯)2 ≤ α
}
. (1.47)
Now, let ε > 0 be a lower bound of b>(σσ>)−1b. Observe from the dynamics of θ (1.25) and
the boundedness of the statistics γ, θ, σx¯∗ , and δ (Lemma 1.1 and Assumption 1.4) that
θ is bounded below as well: θ(t) ≥ θ, t ≥ 0. (Keep in mind the convention that learning
began prior to the decision making at time 0.) It follows
Ix¯(t) = Ix¯(0) +
∫ t
0
b(s)>(σ(s)σ(s)>)−1b(s)θ(s)2 ds
≥ Ix¯(0) + εθ2t→∞ as t→∞.
(1.48)
Proof of Proposition 1.11. The claim follows from Propositions 1.7 and 1.9.
Appendix
Here I prove the claim in page 23 that the induced log-likelihood function of mx¯,η(t) without
penalty, namely, `t,m(t), is constant. Familiarity with Section 1.5.3, including the results
given after page 23, is assumed.
Fix t > 0. Let the induced log-likelihood functions `t,m(t) and `
λ
t,m(t) take values from
R ∪ {∞}. By Lemma 1.6, the curvature of `λt,m(t) is given by δ(t)−1. Since δ(t)−1 ↓ 0
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as λ ↓ 0 (see (1.30)), it follows that `λt,m(t) converges to a constant function, or precisely,
limλ↓0(`λt,m(t)(m1) − `λt,m(t)(m2)) = 0 for all m1,m2 ∈ Rnx . Now, the constancy of `t,m(t)
follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 1.10. `t,m(t)(m) = limλ↓0 `λt,m(t)(m) for all m ∈ Rnx .
Proof. Fix m ∈ Rnx . Begin with the trivial observation
`t(x¯, η)− λ
2
∫ t
0
|η(s)|2 ds ≤ `t(x¯, η).
Take supx¯,η with the constraint m
x¯,η(t) = m and then limλ↓0 to see limλ↓0 `λt,m(t)(m) ≤
`t,m(t)(m). Next,
`t(x¯, η)− λ
2
∫ t
0
|η(s)|2 ds ≤ `λt,m(t)(m), η is such that mx¯,η(t) = m,
`t(x¯, η) ≤ lim
λ↓0
`λt,m(t)(m), η is such that m
x¯,η(t) = m,
and `t,m(t)(m) ≤ limλ↓0 `λt,m(t)(m).
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CHAPTER 2 : Consumption/Portfolio Choice
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I apply the model of learning under ambiguity to the consumption/portfolio
choice problem of a multiple-priors log investor. The investor finances his intertemporal
consumption by trading one risk-free asset (bond) and a number of risky assets (stocks).
He believes that stock returns are predictable, but he lacks confidence in his understanding
of market dynamics and finds the stochastic differential equation governing the evolution
of the predictor variables ambiguous.
In Section 2.2, I explain the setup. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 characterize the optimal de-
mand for stocks. In standard, unique-prior models, log investors are well-known to be
myopic. In contrast, a multiple-priors log investor has a nonzero hedging demand when the
investment opportunity set is stochastic (Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez and Schied, 2006, 2007a;
Epstein and Schneider, 2007). In Section 2.5, I consider the special case in which there is
a single stock and the stock return volatility is constant. This simplification allows us to
establish certain analytical properties of the optimal policy. In Section 2.5.3, I numerically
compute the optimal policy and discuss its behavior in comparison with the related models
by Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Miao (2009). Section 2.6 concludes by summarizing
the observations.
2.2 The Setup
As with the previous chapter, time is continuous and varies over [0, T ], T ∈ (0,∞).
2.2.1 Securities Market Dynamics
There is a single consumption good in the economy, which is continuously consumed and
serves as the numeraire. The investor finances his consumption by trading one risk-free
asset (bond) and nS ≥ 1 risky assets (stocks).
The interest rate on the bond is constant at r ∈ R.
Regarding how the stock returns are generated, on the other hand, the investor enter-
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tains multiple theories. Specifically, the theories take the form of probability measures, or
data priors, on a common measurable space. Let there be a measurable space (Ω,F), a set
Q of probability measures (data priors) on (Ω,F), and a filtration F = {Ft} of F . The data
priors are equivalent and F satisfies the usual conditions with respect to the data priors;
that is, F is right-continuous and F0 contains the common null events in F . Under the
data prior Qx¯,η ∈ Q, where (x¯, η) ∈ Rnx×L2([0, T ],Rnx) and nx ≥ 1, the cumulative return
process R = {R(t),Ft} of the stocks is given by part of the solution to the system of SDEs
dR(t) = (aR(t, R,A) + bR(t, R,A)x(t)) dt+ σR(t, R,A) dw(t) (2.1)
dA(t) = (aA(t, R,A) + bA(t, R,A)x(t)) dt+ σA(t, R,A) dw(t) (2.2)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv( dvx¯,η(t) + η(t) dt).
Here:
• A = {A(t),Ft} is an nA-dimensional process, nA ≥ 0, representing the macroeconomic
variables in addition to the stock returns themselves that affect the stock returns;
• x = {x(t),Ft} is an nx-dimensional process;
• nx ≤ nR + nA;
• w = {w(t),Ft} and vx¯,η = {vx¯,η(t),Ft} are mutually independent Wiener processes
of dimension nR + nA and nx, respectively;
• aR, bR, σR, aA, bA, and σA are non-anticipating path functionals from [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ],RnR+nA) into RnR , RnR×nx , RnR×(nR+nA), RnA , RnA×nx , and RnA×(nR+nA),
respectively.
• κx is an nx×nx diagonal matrix with positive entries, ρw is an nx× (nR+nA) matrix,
and ρv is an nx × nx invertible matrix.
To interpret, the investor believes that the stock returns (and the growth of the addi-
tional macroeconomic state variables A) are predictable, the conditional expected returns
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(and the conditional expected growth of A) being linear in a vector of factors x. But
he lacks confidence in his understanding of the data-generating mechanism and finds the
dynamics (SDE) of the factors ambiguous. Specifically, he lacks confidence in the time-
invariance of the unconditional mean, or the “instantaneous attractor,” of the factors and
suspects the existence of a time-varying component in the latter, thus decomposing it into
a time-invariant component x¯ and a time-varying component η. The investor’s perception
of ambiguity regarding the time-invariant component, that is, parameter, is expressed by
multiple parameter priors, which are for simplicity taken all to be Dirac measures. The time-
varying component is at this point restricted only by the minimal technical requirement of
square-integrability. For a detailed discussion, see Section 1.4.
The investor observes the stock returns and the rest of the relevant macroeconomic
variables, that is, R and A, but not the factors x. In conformity with the notation of
Chapter 1, let y , (R>, A>)> and ny , nR +nA, signifying the observation process and its
dimension. The dynamics (2.1)-(2.2) of the observation process can be rewritten compactly
as
dy(t) = (a(t, y) + b(t, y)x(t)) dt+ σ(t, y) dw(t)
where the definitions of a, b, and σ are obvious. Assume that a, b, and σ satisfy the
assumptions of Chapter 1 (Assumptions 1.1-1.3). Let G = {Gt} be the augmented filtration
generated by y. G represents the accrual of the investor’s information. Under all data
priors, x(0)|G0 ∼ N(m0, γ0). All the common parameters, a, b, σ, κx, ρw, ρv, m0, and γ0,
are known to the investor.
2.2.2 The Investor’s Preferences
The investor has the Chen-Epstein (2002) recursive multiple-priors utility with log felicity.
His conditional preferences at time t, t ∈ [0, T ], are represented by
min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
ξ
∫ T
t
e−βs log(c(s)) dt, c ∈ C
where ξ ∈ Ξ denotes a density generator.
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The learning mechanism proposed in this dissertation defines a map from observations
to a set of one-step-ahead conditionals or equivalently characterizes the set of density gen-
erators Ξ with respect to a reference utility prior P 0. See Section 1.5. Recall in particular
that under a generic utility prior P ξ,
dR(t) = (aR(t, y) + bR(t, y)m
∗
t ) dt+ σR(t, y)( d
ξ(t) + ξ(t) dt)
where m∗t ≡ mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) is the benchmark estimate of the conditional expectation of x(t) given
Gt and ξ = {ξ(t),Gt} is an ny-dimensional Wiener process under P ξ. Ξ(t) thus acquires
the more specific interpretation as the ambiguity in the contemporaneous price of risk.
2.2.3 Trading Strategies and the Budget Constraint
A (1 + nR)-dimensional process (Π
◦,Π), Π(t) = (Π1(t), . . . ,ΠnR(t))
>, is a trading strategy
if G-progressive and ∫ T
0
(|Π◦(t)|+ |Π(t)|2) dt <∞.
Π◦ represents the amount of money invested in the bond and Π those invested in the stocks.
A trading strategy (Π◦,Π) finances a consumption plan c ∈ C if Π◦(T ) + Π(T )>1nR ≥ 0
and
d(Π◦(t) + Π(t)>1nR) = Π
◦(t)r dt+ Π(t)> dR(t)− c(t) dt
where 1nR denotes the nR-dimensional vector of ones. Denote the wealth process Π
◦ +
Π>1nR by W . W satisfies
dW (t) = (W (t)−Π(t)>1nR)r dt+ Π(t)> dR(t)− c(t) dt (2.3)
with initial condition W (0) = Π◦(0) + Π(0)>1nR . In fact, W is the unique strong solution
to the last equation, and therefore, we can suppress Π◦ and identify a trading strategy with
Π. A pair (Π, c) is admissible for initial wealth W (0) if the corresponding wealth process
WΠ,c,W (0) is uniformly bounded below.
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The market is dynamically incomplete if nA > 0. Let
ζ(t) , σR(t)>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1(aR(t) + bR(t)m∗t − r1nR).1
A consumption process c ∈ C can be financed by some trading strategy if and only if it
satisfies the following static budget constraint:
sup
ν∈Ker(σR)
EP
0
∫ T
0
E−(ζ+ν)(t)e−rtc(t) dt ≤W (0) (2.4)
where Ker(σR) denotes the set of processes ν such that σR(t, ω)ν(t, ω) = 0 a.e. (He and
Pearson, 1991; Karatzas et al., 1991; Cuoco, 1997).
Remark 2.1. If the investor had full confidence in a Qx¯,0 ∈ Q, then the present setup
would have as special cases the Bayesian learning models of Lakner (1998), Xia (2001), Zohar
(2001), and Brendle (2006) in which the unobservable instantaneous expected return process
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Hence, this chapter provides a generalization of the
latter models in the case of ambiguity.
2.3 Optimal Consumption and Portfolio
Let C2(u) ⊂ C denote the set of consumption processes such that
EP
0
∫ T
0
[log(c(t))]2 dt <∞.
I define the investor’s problem to be
sup
c∈C2(u)
min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(c(t)) dt (2.5)
subject to the budget constraint (2.4). The objective function in (2.5) is finite for all
(c, ξ) ∈ C2(u) × Ξ due to the definition of C2(u) and the uniform boundedness of Ξ. Let
Cbudget ⊂ C denote the set of consumption processes that satisfy the budget constraint.
1σRσ
>
R is invertible because σ is by Assumption 1.2.
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Lemma 2.1. The minimax theorem holds, that is,
sup
c∈C2(u)∩Cbudget
min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(c(t)) dt = min
ξ∈Ξ
sup
c∈C2(u)∩Cbudget
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(c(t)) dt.
Remark 2.2. It is clear from the proof that the claim is true for any concave felicity, with
the corresponding change to the definition of C2(u).
Proposition 2.1. For a given ξ ∈ Ξ, the inner supremum
sup
c∈C2(u)∩Cbudget
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(c(t)) dt (2.6)
equals
− 1− e
−βT
β
log
(
1− e−βT
β
)
+
β − r
β
(
Te−βT − 1− e
−βT
β
)
+
1− e−βT
β
logW (0)
+ EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
2
|ζ(t) + σR(t)>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1σR(t)ξ(t)|2 dt. (2.7)
Let ξ∗ denote the minimizer of the last expression:
ξ∗ , arg min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
2
|ζ(t) + σR(t)>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1σR(t)ξ(t)|2 dt. (2.8)
The optimal consumption process is given by
c∗(t) = βW (0)ert
e−βt
1− e−βT
Eξ∗(t)
E−(ζ+ν∗)(t) (2.9)
ν∗(t) = [σR(t)>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1σR(t)− Iny ]ξ∗(t). (2.10)
Hence the key is to solve (2.8). Note for later reference that
ζ(t) + σR(t)
>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1σR(t)ξ(t)
= σR(t)
>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1(aR(t) + bR(t)m∗t − r1nR + σR(t)ξ(t)). (2.11)
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To find the trading strategy that finances c∗, observe first that the wealth process
corresponding to c∗ is
W ∗(t) =
1
B(t)−1E−(ζ+ν∗)(t) E
P 0
(∫ T
t
B(s)−1E−(ζ+ν∗)(s)c∗(s) ds
∣∣∣∣Gt)
= W (0)ert
e−βt − e−βT
1− e−βT
Eξ∗(t)
E−(ζ+ν∗)(t) .
(2.12)
Thus its differential is
dW ∗(t) = W ∗(t)(ζ(t) + ν∗(t) + ξ∗(t))> d+ ·dt.
Comparing the last expression with (2.3) and recalling (2.10), we see that
pi∗(t) , Π∗(t)/W ∗(t)
= (σR(t)σR(t)
>)−1 (aR(t) + bR(t)m∗t − r1nR + σR(t)ξ∗(t)) (2.13)
where pi∗ denotes the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the stock.
The optimal consumption plan c∗ found above equals the optimal consumption plan of
the Bayesian investor with unique prior P ξ
∗
. In accordance, pi∗ equals the stock demand of
the same Bayesian investor, the term involving ξ∗ accounting for the discrepancy between
P ξ
∗
and P 0. This observation also suggests that as is characteristic of Bayesian log investors,
the optimal consumption is given by a fraction of wealth independent of other state variables,
or precisely,
c∗(t) =
β
1− e−β(T−t)W
∗(t),
as can be verified from (2.9) and (2.12).
2.4 Markovian Characterization
Suppose the economy is Markovian, that is,
f(t, R,A) = f(t, R(t), A(t))
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where f = a, b, and σ. Then the investor’s information can be summarized by a finite
number of Markovian variables.
Observe first that the Bayesian investor who has full confidence in a Qx¯,0 ∈ Q has the
following as the state variables (see Proposition 1.2):
R(t), A(t), mx¯,0(t), and γ(t).
Our investor also has these as state variables, with the obvious replacement of mx¯,0(t) by
mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) ≡ m∗t , that is,
R(t), A(t), m∗t , and γ(t) (2.14)
and has the following in addition:
x¯∗t , σx¯∗(t), Ix¯(t)−1, and δ(t). (2.15)
See Propositions 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9. The first three of (2.15) originates from the estimation of
x¯; the last is needed to describe the set of one-step-ahead conditionals Ξ(t). The standard
control approach to the minimization (2.8) requires that Ξ(t), ζ(t), and σR(t) be functions
of some (multidimensional) Markov process, and Propositions 1.6 and 1.7 confirm that the
variables identified in (2.14) and (2.15) form a closed system of Markovian variables. Collect
them in Z,
Z , (R,A,m∗, γ, x¯∗, σx¯∗ , I−1x¯ , δ)>
and write
dZ(t) = µZ(t, Z(t)) dt+ σZ(t, Z(t)) d(t). (2.16)
Remark 2.3. Some of the state variables identified above may be redundant. For example,
if a, b, and σ are deterministic functions of time independent of R and A, then it suffices
to take as state variables m∗ and x¯∗. See Section 2.5 below.
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Define the value function as
J(t, Z) , min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
ξ
(∫ T
t
e−βs − e−βT
β
× 1
2
|ζ(s) + σR(s)>(σR(s)σR(s)>)−1σR(s)ξ(s)|2 ds
∣∣∣∣Z(t) = Z)
subject to the state dynamics (2.16). Picking a particular ξ ∈ Ξ is to say that ξ = {(t),Gt}
defined by dξ(t) = d(t)− ξ(t) dt is a Wiener process. Hence
J(t, Z) = min
ξ∈Ξ
EP
0
(∫ T
t
e−βs − e−βT
β
×1
2
|ζξ(s) + σξR(s)>(σξR(s)σξR(s)>)−1σξR(s)ξ(s)|2 ds
∣∣∣∣Zξ(t) = Z) (2.17)
subject to
dZξ(t) = µZ(t, Z
ξ(t)) dt+ σZ(t, Z
ξ(t))( d(t) + ξ(t) dt) (2.18)
where σξR(s) ≡ σR(s,Rξ(s), Aξ(s)). (2.17) is linear-quadratic in the control, although not in
the state and hence not linear-quadratic in the classical sense. The corresponding Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
0 = min
ξ(t)∈Ξ(t,Z)
(
∂tJ(t, Z) + (∂ZJ(t, Z))
>(µZ(t, Z) + σZ(t, Z)ξ(t))
+
1
2
tr[(∂2ZJ(t, Z))σZ(t, Z)σZ(t, Z)
>]
+
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
2
|ζ(t, Z) + σR(t, Z)>(σR(t, Z)σR(t, Z)>)−1σR(t, Z)ξ(t)|2
) (2.19)
with boundary condition J(T,Z) = 0 for all Z. In general, (2.19) is of degenerate parabolic
type and we can only say that the value function is a viscosity solution of (2.19). But see
Section 2.5.1, where I consider a special case in which the value function is a unique classical
solution to the HJB equation.
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2.5 Example
To gain intuition, I consider in this section the special case in which there is a single stock,
the stock return volatility is constant, and there are no other observable macroeconomic
indicators that affect stock returns. That is, nR = 1 and nA = 0 so that ny = nx = 1 and
σ(t, y) = σR(t, y) = σR ∈ (0,∞) for all (t, y). Assume furthermore aR ≡ 0 and bR ≡ 1.
This setup is simple but rich enough to let us discuss key aspects of the optimal policy.
In Section 2.5.1, I simplify the setup even further by assuming that x¯ is known. In this
case, m∗ is the only state variable and we can show that the value function is differentiable,
which facilitates an analytical analysis of the optimal policy. In Section 2.5.2, I briefly
discuss the case without the assumption of a known x¯. Finally, in Section 2.5.3, I numerically
compute the optimal stock demand and discuss implications of learning under ambiguity in
comparison with the related models by Epstein and Schneider (2007) and Miao (2009).
2.5.1 x¯ Known
Suppose first that the long-run expected return x¯ is known.
Optimal Policy Revisited
Under the aforementioned assumptions, the investor’s problem is Markovian and his optimal
stock demand can be written in a simple feedback form.
Recall Section 2.4 and note that (i) R and A are redundant as state variables because
σ is constant, (ii) γ and δ are redundant because they are deterministic, and (iii) x¯∗ ≡ x¯,
σx¯∗ , and I−1x¯ are redundant because x¯ is known. It thus suffices to take m∗ as the sole state
variable (Z = m∗). The controlled state dynamics are (see (1.24))
dm∗,ξt = κx(x¯−m∗,ξt ) dt+ (ρwσR + γ(t) + δ(t))σ−1R ( d(t) + ξ(t) dt)
=: µm∗(m
∗,ξ
t ) dt+ σm∗(t)( d(t) + ξ(t) dt).
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The price of risk under P 0 is simplified to
ζ(m∗) =
m∗ − r
σR
.
The set Ξ(t) representing the ambiguity in the price of risk is given by an interval [−ξ¯(t), ξ¯(t)]
where
ξ¯(t) ,
√
2αδ(t)
σR
.
ξ¯(t) measures the magnitude of the ambiguity in the price of risk and is increasing in the
index α of the investor’s ambiguity aversion and the estimation ambiguity δ(t). Also, it
decreases monotonically and deterministically over time, converging to a constant, as is a
property of δ. The estimated equity premium is m∗ − r and the ambiguity in the equity
premium is σRξ¯(t) =
√
2αδ(t). (Unless necessary, the (true or estimated) instantaneous
equity premium will be referred to simply as the equity premium. x¯−r or x¯∗t −r will always
be called the long-run equity premium.)
Next, the HJB equation (2.19) is simplified to
0 = min
ξ(t)∈Ξ(t)
(
∂tJ(t,m
∗) + (∂m∗J(t,m∗))(µm∗(m∗) + σm∗(t)ξ(t))
+
1
2
(∂2m∗J(t,m
∗))σm∗(t)2 +
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
2
(ζ(m∗) + ξ(t))2
)
(2.20)
with boundary condition J(T,m∗) = 0 for all m∗. It is still not clear if (2.20) allows for
an analytical solution, but we can now check some basic properties of the value function.2
For a function f : [0, T ]× R→ R, f ∈ C1,2([0, T ]× R) means that f(t,m∗) is continuously
differentiable in t and twice continuously differentiable in m∗. f ∈ Cp([0, T ] × R) means
that the continuous function f satisfies the polynomial growth condition
|f(t,m∗)| ≤ K(1 + |m∗|n)
2It is possible to formulate (2.20) as a free boundary problem and characterize the solution to a certain
degree (cf. Davis and Norman (1990)), but there is little practical benefit and I do not pursue in this direction.
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for some constants K and n. Assume for the rest of Section 2.5.1,
Assumption 2.1. σ2m∗ : [0, T ]→ R is bounded below away from zero.
The assumption trivially holds if ρw ≥ 0.
Proposition 2.2. (i) The partial differential equation (2.20) with its boundary condition
has a unique solution K ∈ C1,2([0, T ]× R) ∩ Cp([0, T ]× R).
(ii) K is the value function, that is, K = J .
(iii)
ξ∗(t,m∗) = max
{−ξ¯(t),min{ξ¯(t), ξU (t,m∗)}}
ξU (t,m∗) , −ζ(m∗)− βe
βt
1− e−β(T−t)σm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗).
Thus, in particular, the optimal control ξ∗ : ¯[0, T ]× R→ R is continuous.
The expression for the optimal stock demand (2.13) becomes
pi∗(t,m∗) =
m∗ − r + σRξ∗(t,m∗)
σ2R
= max
{
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
,min
{
m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
,
− 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗)
}}
. (2.21)
Lemma 2.2. (i) J(t,m∗) is convex in m∗.
(ii)
∂m∗J(t,m
∗) = EP
0
(∫ T
t
e−βs − e−βT
β
e−κx(s−t)
σR
m∗,ξ
∗
s − r + σRξ∗(s)
σR
ds
∣∣∣∣∣m∗,ξ∗t = m∗
)
.
From the convexity, that is, from the fact that ∂m∗J(t,m
∗) is nondecreasing in m∗, it
follows that
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
= − 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗)
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and
m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
= − 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗)
as equations in m∗ each has a unique solution, m∗(t) and m∗(t) < m∗(t), respectively. pi∗
can be rewritten as
pi∗(t,m∗) =

m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
if m∗ < m∗(t)
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
if m∗ > m∗(t)
− 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗) if m∗ ∈ [m∗(t),m∗(t)].
Since ξ∗ is bounded, the effect of ambiguity on ∂m∗J(t,m∗) is negligible for m∗s with a
large absolute value. Combined with convexity, this implies thatm∗ 7→ J(t,m∗) is U-shaped.
(Epstein and Schneider (2007) in p. 1296 make a similar observation from a numerical
exercise.) As with his Bayesian counterpart with unique (data and utility) prior Qx¯,0, our
multiple-priors investor, too, is better off when the estimated equity premium is further
away from zero, that is, when the stocks are (locally, in expected terms) more distinct from
the bond. The U-shape implies that the optimal policy may have curvature in the central
region m∗ ∈ [m∗(t),m∗(t)].
Compared to the Bayesian policy, our investor’s stock demand is (i) shifted up by the
ambiguity in the equity premium (divided by the return variance) when the (estimated)
equity premium is sufficiently small (in the sense of < on the real line), (ii) shifted down
by the same amount when the equity premium is sufficiently large, and (iii) proportional
to the negative of the instantaneous covariation between the stock return and the state
(−σRσm∗(t)) and the first derivative of the value function (∂m∗J(t,m∗)), when the equity
premium is intermediate. Clearly, the last case is reminiscent of Merton’s (1973) hedging
demand; it tells the investor to hold more of the stock if it pays in cases of low continuation
utility. (But it is not exactly the same as Merton’s hedging demand. His is such that the
investor holds more of the assets that pay in cases of low consumption, or equivalently, high
marginal utility.) I will have a deeper look at the quantity −σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m∗) later,
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but to talk about hedging, first we have to clarify the myopic demand.
Myopic Demand
The myopic demand is defined to be
pi∗myopic(t,m
∗) ,
[
lim
t→T
pi∗(t,m∗)
]
T=t
.
Proposition 2.3.
pi∗myopic(t,m
∗) =

m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
if m∗ − r < −σRξ¯(t)
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
if m∗ − r > +σRξ¯(t)
0 if − σRξ¯(t) ≤ m∗ − r ≤ σRξ¯(t).
The myopic demand is more conservative than that of the Bayesian investor with unique
prior Qx¯,0 in that in absolute values, the former is dominated by the latter:
|pi∗myopic(t,m∗)| ≤
∣∣∣∣m∗ − rσ2R
∣∣∣∣ for all m∗ and < ∣∣∣∣m∗ − rσ2R
∣∣∣∣ for all m∗ 6= r.
(I am comparing the feedback policies, considering m∗ to be signifying the estimate of each
investor. The actual values of m∗ will differ between the two investors.) Furthermore,
there is a range of equity premia for which our investor neither buys nor sells short the
stock. Say that the estimated equity premium m∗ − r is unambiguously negative if it is
negative and is larger in absolute value than the ambiguity in the equity premium σRξ¯(t);
unambiguously positive if it is positive and is larger in absolute value than the ambiguity
in the equity premium; and not unambiguously distinct from zero, otherwise. Then, the
observation, rephrased, is that the multiple-priors investor, if myopic, does not participate
in the stock market when his estimate of the equity premium is not unambiguously distinct
from zero; and participates when it is unambiguously positive or negative but invests a
smaller fraction of his wealth than the Bayesian counterpart with the same estimate would.
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See Dow and Werlang (1992), who were the first to show in a static setting that there are
a range of prices for which an ambiguity-averse (in the sense of Schmeidler (1989)) investor
will not participate in the stock market.
Hedging Demand
Under risk, log investors don’t hedge; under ambiguity, they do.
Recall the total demand (2.21) and let
pi∗∗hedging(t,m
∗) , − 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗).
As noted earlier, pi∗∗hedging reflects the investor’s desire to hedge against “unfavorable” changes
in the investment opportunity set. Under ambiguity, an unfavorable change in the invest-
ment opportunity set is a change in the state variables that is associated with a decrease
in continuation utility. In the present case, if the estimated equity premium is sufficiently
large that ∂m∗J(t,m
∗) > 0, then the investor would fear a decrease in the estimated equity
premium, that is, its becoming ambiguous, and want to transfer wealth to states with lower
equity premia. And he could do this by holding more of the stock if it pays at times of
lower equity premia and less of it if it does not.
However, the desire to hedge does not fully realize and how much of it realizes de-
pends on the magnitude of the ambiguity present. The total demand pi∗(t,m∗) is given
by pi∗∗hedging(t,m
∗) confined between (m∗ − r ± σRξ¯(t))/σ2R, which collapse to the Bayesian
policy (m∗−r)/σ2R when no ambiguity is present. Hence, I call pi∗∗hedging the shadow hedging
demand. Finally, based on the interpretation of pi∗∗hedging, the difference between the total
demand and the myopic demand, pi∗ − pi∗myopic, is called the hedging demand, although the
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intent is not fully realized:
pi∗hedging(t,m
∗) , pi∗(t,m∗)− pi∗myopic(t,m∗)
= max
{
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
,min
{
m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
, pi∗∗hedging(t,m
∗)
}}
−max
{
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
,min
{
m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
, 0
}}
.
A long-horizon, multiple-priors log investor’s nonmyopic behavior was first observed
in discrete time by Epstein and Schneider (2007) and in continuous time by Herna´ndez-
Herna´ndez and Schied (2007a).
In Comparison with Merton (1973)
The hedging demand pi∗hedging, or fundamentally the shadow hedging demand pi
∗∗
hedging, is
reminiscent of Merton’s (1973) hedging demand but not the same. The difference lies in
what are unfavorable changes in the investment opportunity set. Under risk, they are
associated with high marginal utility with respect to wealth, or by way of the first-order
condition, with low consumption; under ambiguity, with low continuation utility.
To draw further comparison between pi∗∗hedging and Merton’s hedging demand, recall that
the latter is the position in the stock that minimizes the volatility of consumption. On the
other hand, pi∗∗hedging is the position in the stock that minimizes the effect of misspecification
on continuation utility (or more precisely, on the expected change over the next instant in
continuation utility). To elaborate, let
V (t,m∗,W ) , EP ξ
∗
(∫ T
t
e−βs log(c∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣m∗t = m∗,W pi∗,c∗(t) = W) .
As is characteristic of log investors, V additively separates to a part depending only on
(t,W ∗) and another depending only on (t,m∗), and I have been focusing on the latter
denoted by J . Let further
f(ξ) , E
P ξ [ dV (t,m∗t ,W pi,c(t))|m∗t = m∗,W pi,c(t) = W ]
dt
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and observe that
∂ξ(t)(f(ξ)− f(0)) = Wpi(t)σR∂WV (t,m∗,W ) + σm∗(t)∂m∗V (t,m∗,W ).
From (2.7),
∂WV (t,m
∗,W ) =
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
W
and ∂m∗V (t,m
∗,W ) = ∂m∗J(t,m∗).
It follows that |∂ξ(t)(f(ξ)− f(0))| attains its minimum (zero) at pi(t) = pi∗∗hedging(t,m∗).
2.5.2 x¯ Unknown and Ambiguous
Suppose now that the investor does not know the value of x¯ and entertains all the data
priors Q = {Qx¯,η : (x¯, η) ∈ R× L2([0, T ],R)}.
As before, R and A are redundant as state variables because σ is constant and γ, δ,
σx¯∗ , and I−1x¯ are redundant because they are deterministic. But now x¯∗ needs to be taken
as a state variable as well as m∗:
Z = (m∗, x¯∗)
with dynamics (see Proposition 1.6)
dZξ(t) =
 κx(x¯∗,ξt −m∗,ξt )
0
 dt+
 ρwσR + γ(t) + δ(t)
κ−1x σx¯∗(t)
σ−1R ( d(t) + ξ(t) dt)
= µZ(Z
ξ(t)) dt+ σZ(t)( d(t) + ξ(t) dt).
Since the diffusion matrix σZσ
>
Z is degenerate, the value function J may not be differen-
tiable. Nevertheless, I assume that ∂ZJ(t, Z) exists everywhere and write
pi∗(t,m∗, x¯∗) = max
{
m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
,min
{
m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t)
σ2R
, pi∗∗hedging(t,m
∗, x¯∗)
}}
74
pi∗∗hedging(t,m
∗, x¯∗) , − 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t) (ρwσR + γ(t) + δ(t))∂m∗J(t,m
∗, x¯∗)
− 1
σ2R
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)κ
−1
x σx¯∗(t)∂x¯∗J(t,m
∗, x¯∗).
I call the first term of pi∗∗hedging the m
∗-shadow hedging demand and the second the x¯∗-shadow
hedging demand.
2.5.3 Numerical Analysis
Continue to assume that the investor entertains all the data priors Q = {Qx¯,η : (x¯, η) ∈
R × L2([0, T ],R)}. In this subsection, I numerically compute the optimal stock demand
pi∗(t,m∗, x¯∗) and discuss its behavior.
The securities market model is calibrated as follows (all numbers are annual):
dR(t) = x(t) dt+ 0.1428 dw(t)
dx(t) = 0.2743(x¯− x(t)) dt− 0.0392 dw(t) + 0.0361 dvx¯,0(t)
and r = 0.0432.3 The investor has observed 20 years of data and now faces a 10-year
investment horizon. β = 0.03, λ = ∞, and α = 0.38. These parameters translate into an
ambiguity in the equity premium of 0.01. Also, σZ(20) = (0.007, 0.009)
>.
Figure 2.1 shows the corresponding optimal stock demand as a function of the estimated
instantaneous equity premium, with the estimated long-run equity premium fixed at 0.0458
(Barberis’ estimate). In the left plot, the solid line passing through the origin shows the
Bayesian demand; the kinked dashed line, the myopic demand; the dotted lines, the m∗-
3I annualized the monthly estimates by Barberis (2000) (left panel of his Table II). Barberis’ estimation is
based on the monthly NYSE value-weighted returns as calculated by the CRSP, from June 1952 to December
1995.
Barberis assumes that excess stock returns are predicted by the dividend yield, whereas the predictor
variables of the present model, x, are unobservable. Hence, I calibrated the SDE for x so that the SDE for
mx¯,0 matches Barberis’ estimation:
dmx¯,0(t) = 0.2743(x¯−mx¯,0(t)) dt− 0.0031 dw¯x¯,0(t)
where −0.0031 = limt→∞(ρw + γ(t)/σR). To be precise, Barberis finds, in accordance with other empirical
works, excess stock returns and the dividend yield to be highly negatively correlated (−0.9351), and I set R
and mx¯,0 to be perfectly negatively correlated.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal stock demand (fraction of wealth) as a function of the estimated
instantaneous equity premium (annual, decimal). The investor has observed 20 years of
data and now faces a 10-year investment horizon. β = 0.03, λ = ∞, α = 0.38, and
the estimated long-run equity premium x¯∗t − r is fixed at 0.0458. Left plot: The solid line
passing through the origin shows the Bayesian demand; the dashed line, the myopic demand;
the dotted lines, the shadow hedging demands; finally, the thick solid line shows the total
demand. Right plot: An analysis of the optimal stock demand.
, x¯∗-, and total shadow hedging demands; and finally, the thick solid line shows the total
demand. As observed analytically, the total demand is given by the shadow hedging demand
if the latter is moderate compared to the magnitude of the ambiguity present; otherwise,
the investor behaves as if he were a Bayesian investor whose estimate of the equity premium
is m∗ − r − σRξ¯(t) or m∗ − r + σRξ¯(t). The hedging demands are represented by a shaded
region in the right plot. Note that the investor hedges for a range of equity premia wider
than dictated by the ambiguity in his estimate and the hedging demands are significant. For
example, when the estimated equity premium is −0.01, the long-horizon investor facing a
10-year horizon sells short an amount of the stock worth about 100% of his wealth, whereas
a myopic investor would take no position in the stock.
In Comparison with Epstein and Schneider (2007)
To further analyze the optimal policy, it helps to contrast it with that of other related
models, and first I consider Epstein and Schneider (2007).4
First, in Epstein and Schneider (2007), a long-horizon multiple-priors investor still holds
4Epstein and Schneider’s model is in discrete time, and the difference is nontrivial. For a comparison
between their model and mine in terms of modeling learning under ambiguity, and more importantly, the
latter’s theoretical contribution, see Chapter 1.
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no stock when there is no premium. In Figure 2.1, on the other hand, pi∗ is negative around
zero equity premium. This is due to the asymmetry in the dynamics of x and consequently
of the estimated equity premium m∗ − r. When the true equity premium is constant and
known, a log investor’s value function is quadratic in equity premium. Hence, in particular,
it is symmetric at zero equity premium and is strictly increasing in the absolute value of the
equity premium; or, the investor is better off when the stock is (locally, in expected terms)
more distinct from the bond. However, since in the present model m∗ − r is attracted to
x¯∗ − r, the current value of which is positive, the value function rises in the right vicinity
of zero equity premium and rises more in the right vicinity than in the left vicinity because
a negative m∗ − r will pass the minimum of the value function before reaching a positive
x¯∗ − r. Consequently, ∂m∗J(t, 0, x¯∗) > 0. ∂x¯∗J(t, 0, x¯∗) > 0 for the obvious reason and the
negative demands around zero equity premium follow.
When the desire to hedge fully realizes, it may give rise to contrarian behavior. Note in
Figure 2.1 that when the equity premium falls around−0.02, the investor exhibits contrarian
behavior in the sense that he decreases his stock holdings as the equity premium increases.
In the absence of ambiguity (see, for example, Brendle (2006)), as the equity premium
improves, that is, as it moves toward the direction of increasing the continuation utility, the
marginal indirect utility of an improvement in the equity premium strictly increases and so
does the desire to hedge. The introduction of ambiguity does not fundamentally alter this
structure because the density generators are bounded by ξ¯ and ξ¯ is independent of equity
premium. Epstein and Schneider (2007) make a similar observation that their investor is
contrarian in the sense that when the equity premium is not unambiguously distinct from
zero, he goes long for negative premia and short for positive premia. This restricted form of
contrarian behavior results from the symmetric structure of their model. Note finally that
contrarian behavior is not robust. When σm∗(t) < 0, it may be absent. See Figure 2.4.
What, then, exactly is the dependence of the stock demand on the estimated long-run
equity premium? The argument leading to ∂m∗J(t, 0, x¯
∗) > 0 suggests that if the current
value of x¯∗ − r is negative, ∂m∗J(t, 0, x¯∗) < 0. This is indeed the case. See Figure 2.2; I
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Figure 2.2: Optimal stock demand (fraction of wealth) as a function of the estimated
instantaneous equity premium (annual, decimal). The parametrization is the same as Figure
2.1 except that the estimated long-run equity premium x¯∗t − r is 0 for the left plot and
−0.0458 for the right plot, as opposed to 0.0458.
changed the value of x¯∗t − r from 0.0458 to 0 (left plot) and −0.0458 (right plot). When
x¯∗t − r = −0.0458, both derivatives are negative as expected and the corresponding hedging
demand is positive. In Figure 2.3, I fix the instantaneous equity premium at values close
to zero and plot the optimal stock demand as a function of the long-run equity premium.
Note that the demand is nonincreasing in the long-run equity premium and is strictly
decreasing for a range of long-run equity premia. (The shadow hedging demand line in the
demand-instantaneous premium plot shifts southwest as the long-run premium increases.)
It is possible to show, following the proof of Lemma 2.2(i), that J(t,m∗, x¯∗) is convex in
(m∗, x¯∗) and hence in particular in x¯∗; that is, the investor is better off also when the stock
is more distinct from the bond in the long run. Accordingly, the desire to hedge against
low continuation utility results in contrarian behavior with respect to the long-run equity
premium. Compare the monotonic dependence of the demand on the long-run premium
and its nonmonotonic dependence on the instantaneous premium. Such a distinction is
absent in Epstein and Schneider (2007) because they focus on memoryless data-generating
mechanisms, that is, a constant investment opportunity set.
The constant investment opportunity set also implies that in Epstein and Schneider
(2007) hedging demands disappear as time goes to infinity. In contrast, in the present
model, the desire to hedge against adverse changes in the estimate of the instantaneous
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Figure 2.3: Optimal stock demand (fraction of wealth) as a function of the estimated long-
run equity premium (annual, decimal). The parametrization is the same as Figure 2.1
except that now the long-run premium x¯∗t − r is the independent variable.
equity premium, that is, the m∗-shadow hedging demand, persists.
In Comparison with Miao (2009)
Miao (2009) also considers the portfolio choice problem of a multiple-priors investor in
continuous time who partially observes stochastic investment opportunities. However, his
notion of learning is fundamentally different from mine.
To review Miao’s model in the context of the present model, pick a data prior Qx¯,0,
x¯ ∈ R. A utility prior P ξ is characterized by the filtered stock return dynamics
dR(t) = mx¯,0(t) dt+ σR( dw¯
x¯,0,ξ(t) + ξ(t) dt), |ξ(t)| ≤ ξ¯
where w¯x¯,0,ξ = {w¯x¯,0,ξ(t),Gt} is a Wiener process under P ξ. That is, (i) the “center” of
the set of one-step-ahead conditionals is obtained by the standard Bayesian learning under
Qx¯,0 and (ii) after the Bayesian updating, there remains an exogenous and time-invariant
ambiguity. Thus, in particular, learning and ambiguity do not interact. In contrast, in
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Figure 2.4: Confidence and optimal stock demand. The investor has learned all that he
can (t → ∞) and now faces a 10-year investment horizon. β = 0.03 and x¯∗∞ − r = 0.0458.
α varies as λ does in such a way that the ambiguity in the instantaneous equity premium√
2αδ(t =∞;λ) stays at 0.01. Left plot: Optimal stock demand (fraction of wealth) as
a function of the estimated instantaneous equity premium (annual, decimal), for different
levels of the investor’s confidence λ in the reference likelihood. Right plot: The same demand
at m∗ − r = 0 as a function of λ.
the present model, the innovation receives a larger weight when the current estimate m∗t is
ambiguous, that is, when δ(t) is large.
In fact, Miao’s model is the limit of the present model as t, λ, α→∞ with the restriction√
2αδ(t;λ)/σR = ξ¯. Note that t → ∞ is consistent with the IID ambiguity; λ → ∞, that
is, full confidence in the reference likelihood, with Bayesian learning; and α→∞ with the
positive a posteriori ambiguity despite the full confidence.
In Figure 2.4, I plot the optimal stock demand corresponding to different levels of
confidence λ. The investor has learned all that he can, meaning that γ, δ, and x¯∗ have
converged, and now faces a 10-year investment horizon. β = 0.03 as before and x¯∗∞ −
r = 0.0458. α varies as λ does in such a way that the ambiguity in the instantaneous
equity premium
√
2αδ(t =∞;λ) stays at 0.01. The left plot shows the Markov policies. In
particular, the solid black line (top) corresponds to full confidence and hence to the Miao
demand. Note that it is increasing everywhere, that is, there is no region of contrarian
behavior. This is because stock returns are negatively correlated with the state variable
m∗: σm∗(∞) = ρw + γ(∞)/σR = −0.003.
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More importantly, the stock demand monotonically decreases as the investor loses con-
fidence. See the right plot, which shows the stock demand at m∗ − r = 0 as λ varies.
Intuitively, learning under ambiguity creates extra correlation compared to Bayesian learn-
ing between the observable variable R and the estimate of the unobservable variable m∗ and
the more correlated an asset is with state variables, the better-suited it is for hedging. The
effect of learning under ambiguity can be significant; the difference between Miao’s predic-
tion and mine can be as large as 50% of wealth, depending on the investor’s confidence.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I applied the model of learning under ambiguity to the consumption/portfolio
choice problem of a multiple-priors log investor who finds stock returns ambiguous.
In contrast with his Bayesian counterpart, a multiple-priors log investor has a nonzero
hedging demand for stocks. Suppose there is a single stock. Then, the total demand is
determined by the investor’s desire to hedge against a transition to a state with low contin-
uation utility if it is moderate compared to the a posteriori ambiguity. Otherwise, the total
demand as a function of the estimated equity premium is given by the Bayesian policy uni-
formly shifted up by the ambiguity in the equity premium (divided by the return variance)
when the estimated equity premium is sufficiently low and by the Bayesian policy uniformly
shifted down by the same amount when the estimated equity premium is sufficiently high.
Learning has the following effects on the optimal demand. First, due to the fact that the
estimate of the instantaneous equity premium instantaneously reverts to the contemporane-
ous estimate of the long-run equity premium, the optimal demand around zero instantaneous
equity premium can be different from zero; it is nonincreasing in the long-run equity pre-
mium and is strictly decreasing for a range of long-run equity premia. Second, when the
desire to hedge fully realizes, it may give rise to contrarian behavior in the sense that the
investor decreases his stock holdings as the equity premium increases. However, contrar-
ian behavior is not robust and it is absent when the stock return and the estimate equity
premium are negatively correlated. Third, the optimal demand monotonically decreases as
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the investor loses confidence. The effect of learning under ambiguity can be significant; the
difference between the demand that takes into account a lack of confidence and that that
does not can be as large as 50% of wealth.
2.7 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let M , {Eξ : ξ ∈ Ξ}. Define f :M× (C2(u) ∩ Cbudget) by
f(M, c) , EP 0
∫ T
0
e−βtM(t) log(c(t)) dt.
The claim is
sup
c∈C2(u)∩Cbudget
min
M∈M
f(M, c) = min
M∈M
sup
c∈C2(u)∩Cbudget
f(M, c).
I apply the Kneser-Fan minimax theorem (Fan (1953), Theorem 2). The conclusion
follows once the following three assumptions are checked.
(i) M is a compact Hausdorff space. Let L2([0, T ] × Ω) ≡ L2([0, T ] × Ω,B[0, T ] ⊗
GT ,Lebesgue× P 0) be the set of processes h such that
‖h‖ ,
(
EP
0
∫ T
0
h(t)2 dt
)1/2
<∞.
L2([0, T ] × Ω) is a reflexive Banach space with the norm ‖ · ‖ defined above. By design,
M ⊂ L2([0, T ] × Ω). Let K ≥ 0 be such that Ξ(t) ∈ [−K,K]ny , t ≥ 0. (K may be
state-dependent. See Section 2.4 and Remark 1.3.) For all M ∈M,
‖M‖2 ≤ EP 0
∫ T
0
E(2ξ)(t)enyK2T dt = TenyK2T
and M is norm-bounded. M is norm-closed by Lemma B.1 of Cuoco and Cvitanic´ (1998)
and is convex by (the proof of) Theorem 2.1(c) of Chen and Epstein (2002); thus, it is
weakly closed. By Alaoglu’s theorem, then,M is weakly compact. The weak topology of a
normed space is Hausdorff and so is a subspace.
(ii) For every c ∈ C2(u)∩Cbudget, f(M, c) is lower semicontinuous on M. Let span(M)
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be the linear span of M over R; span(M) ⊂ L2([0, T ] × Ω) is a normed space. For each
c ∈ C2(u) ∩ Cbudget, the map f˜ c : span(M)→ R,
M 7→ EP 0
∫ T
0
e−βtM(t) log(c(t)) dt
is linear; by Ho¨lder’s inequality, the norm of f˜ c is bounded by ‖ log c‖ < ∞. Then there
exists an extension f c of f˜ c such that the linear functional f c defined on L2([0, T ] × Ω)
is continuous in the norm topology, and consequently, in the weak topology (Aliprantis
and Border (1999), Lemma 6.13). Being a restriction of f c to M ⊂ span(M), f(·, c) is
continuous as well.
(iii) f is convexlike on M and concavelike on C2(u)∩Cbudget. M and C2(u)∩Cbudget are
both convex. It then suffices to note that (M, c) 7→M log c is convex-concave on (0,∞)2.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Apply the minimax theorem and write the dual of the inner
supremization as
inf
ν
EP
0
∫ T
0
max
c(t)
[
Eξ(t)e−βt log(c(t))− ΛE−(ζ+ν)(t)e−rtc(t)
]
dt (2.22)
where Λ > 0. The solution to the dual problem solves the primal problem as well (He and
Pearson, 1991; Karatzas et al., 1991). c∗(t) and Λ∗ are standard.
Plugging c∗ to (2.22), ignoring irrelevant terms, and exchanging the order of integration,
we reach
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt − e−βT
β
1
2
inf
ν(t)
|ζ(t) + ν(t) + ξ(t)|2 dt.
Without ξ, the minimizing ν(t) is 0 because ν(t) ∈ Ker(σR(t)). With ξ, on the other hand,
|ζ(t) + ν(t) + ξ(t)|2 = |ζ(t) + ξ(t)|2 + |ν(t)|2 + 2ξ(t)>ν(t)
and under the constraint σR(t)ν(t) = 0, the unique minimizer is given by ν
∗(t) = f(t)ξ(t)
where
f(t) , σR(t)>(σR(t)σR(t)>)−1σR(t)− Iny .
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Observe that f = f> and f2 = −f , and plug c∗, ν∗, and Λ∗ to (2.6).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. (i) follows from Theorem IV.4.3 of Fleming and Soner (1993).
The assumptions of the theorem are (IV.3.5) and (IV.4.6) in their book. (IV.3.5) is the
uniform parabolicity assumption, which is equivalent in the present case to Assumption
2.1. (IV.4.6) is a collection of regularity conditions that can be checked straightforwardly.
(ii) and (iii) follow from Theorem IV.3.1 of Fleming and Soner (1993).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. (i) Let
F (t,m∗, ξ) , EP 0
∫ T
t
e−βs − e−βT
β
1
2
(
m∗,ξs − r + σRξ(s)
σR
)2
ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣m∗,ξt = m∗

so that J(t,m∗) = minξ F (t,m∗, ξ). The convexity of m∗ 7→ J(t,m∗) follows from that of
(m∗, ξ) 7→ F (t,m∗, ξ) and of Ξ: Suppose m∗ = hm∗1 + (1− h)m∗2, h ∈ [0, 1], and let ξ∗1 and
ξ∗2 be the respective minimizers. Then
J(t,m∗) ≤ F (t, hm∗1 + (1− h)m∗2, hξ∗1 + (1− h)ξ∗2)
≤ hJ(t,m∗1) + (1− h)J(t,m∗2).
(ii) ∂m∗J(t,m
∗) is obtained via the envelope theorem: If ∂m∗J(t,m∗) and ∂m∗F (t,m∗, ξ∗)
exist, then ∂m∗J(t,m
∗) = ∂m∗F (t,m∗, ξ∗). (See Milgrom and Segal (2002), Theorem 1.)
Observe
m∗,ξs = e
−κx(s−t)
(
m∗,ξt +
∫ s
t
eκx(τ−t)[κxx¯ dτ + σm∗(τ)( d(τ) + ξ(τ) dτ)]
)
and let
f(s, t,m∗, ξ) , e
−βs − e−βT
β
1
2
(
m∗,ξs − r + σRξ(s)
σR
)2
, m∗,ξt = m
∗
so that
F (t,m∗, ξ) = EP
0
∫ T
t
f(s, t,m∗, ξ) ds.
Now, it is straightforward to check the conditions for differentiating under the integral
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(Durrett (2005), Theorem A.9.1) and we have ∂m∗F (t,m
∗, ξ) = EP
0 ∫ T
t ∂m∗f(s, t,m
∗, ξ) ds.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. It suffices to show
lim
t→T
βeβt
1− e−β(T−t)σRσm∗(t)∂m∗J(t,m
∗) = 0.
Recall Lemma 2.2(ii) and let
K(t,m∗) , sup
s∈[t,T ]
EP
0
∣∣∣∣∣e−κx(s−t)σR m
∗,ξ∗
s − r + σRξ∗(s)
σR
∣∣∣∣∣ , m∗,ξ∗t = m∗.
Then
∣∣∣∣ βeβt1− e−β(T−t)∂m∗J(t,m∗)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ βeβt1− e−β(T−t)
∫ T
t
e−βs − e−βT
β
dsK(t,m∗)
=
(
1
β
− T − t
eβ(T−t) − 1
)
K(t,m∗).
limt→T K(t,m∗) <∞ because (i)
m∗,ξ
∗
s = m
∗,0
s + e
−κx(s−t)
∫ s
t
eκx(τ−t)σm∗(τ)ξ∗(τ) dτ where m
∗,0
t = m
∗
t ,
(ii)
K(t,m∗) ≤ 1
σ2R
(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
EP
0 |m∗,0s |+
∫ T
t
eκx(τ−t)|σm∗(τ)|ξ¯(τ) dτ + r + σRξ¯(t)
)
,
and (iii) EP
0 |m∗,0s | = g(s− t,m∗) for some function g continuous in s− t. Thus,
lim
t→T
∣∣∣∣ βeβt1− e−β(T−t)∂m∗J(t,m∗)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0 · limt→T K(t,m∗) = 0.
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CHAPTER 3 : Asset Pricing
3.1 Introduction
Finally in Chapter 3, I investigate asset pricing implications of learning under ambiguity.
Specifically, I consider a Lucas economy populated by a representative agent with log felicity
who finds the exogenous dividend dynamics ambiguous. The equilibrium equity premium
is given by the sum of (i) the risk premium from the C-CAPM (Breeden, 1979), (ii) an
ambiguity premium, which is increasing in the a posteriori ambiguity, and (iii) a misspeci-
fication premium, which is increasing in the discrepancy between the expected growth rate
of dividends estimated by the agent and that under the true probability measure.
I make three observations regarding the equilibrium equity premium.
First, learning about time-invariant factors of the data-generating mechanism generates
a decreasing trend in the a posteriori ambiguity, and consequently, in the equity premium.
The declining equity premium is naturally accompanied by an initially low but rising interest
rate. These trends over the latter part of the 20th century have been documented by Merton
(1980), Blanchard (1993), and Jagannathan et al. (2000), to name a few. Furthermore,
the model predicts that if the agent do not fear the existence of time-varying ambiguous
factors in the data-generating mechanism, the equity premium will eventually reach the
level predicted by the standard model.
Second, suppose there is a noisy signal about the unobservable state of the economy.
Then, the endogenous relationship between a posteriori ambiguity and signal precision
implied by the learning mechanism is such that a posteriori ambiguity is initially increasing
in signal precision. Thus, an increase in signal precision can partly account for high equity
premia.
Third, the relationship between the equity premium and the conditional variance of
returns is uncertain. A positive linear relationship between the two has long been subject to
estimation in the literature. However, “the search for a significant time-invariant expected
return-volatility tradeoff type relationship has largely proven elusive” (Bollerslev et al.,
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2009). I show that when the growth of dividends and the expected growth rate of dividends
are negatively correlated, the correlation between the equity premium and the conditional
variance of returns can range from one to negative values as the agent’s ambiguity aversion
varies.
3.2 The Economy
Consider the following continuous-time Lucas economy.
The economy is populated by a representative agent with finite horizon T ∈ (0,∞), who
finances his intertemporal consumption by trading two financial assets, one locally risk-free
asset (bond) and one risky asset (stock). The consumption good serves as the numeraire.
The bond is in zero net supply.
The stock is the claim to an exogenous dividend stream. Regarding how the dividends
are generated, the agent entertains multiple theories. Specifically, the theories take the
form of probability measures, or data priors, on a common measurable space. Let there be
a measurable space (Ω,F), a set Q of probability measures (data priors) on (Ω,F), and a
filtration F = {Ft} of F . The data priors are equivalent and F satisfies the usual conditions
with respect to the data priors; that is, F is right-continuous and F0 contains the common
null events in F . Under the data prior Qx¯,η ∈ Q, (x¯, η) ∈ R×L2([0, T ],R), the dividend-rate
process D = {D(t),Ft} is given by part of the solution to the system of SDEs
dD(t)/D(t) = (aD(t,D,A) + bD(t,D,A)x(t)) dt+ σD(t,D,A) dw(t) (3.1)
dA(t) = (aA(t,D,A) + bA(t,D,A)x(t)) dt+ σA(t,D,A) dw(t) (3.2)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv( dvx¯,η(t) + η(t) dt). (3.3)
Here:
• A = {A(t),Ft} is an nA-dimensional process, nA ≥ 0, representing the macroeconomic
variables in addition to the dividends themselves that affect the growth of dividends;
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• x = {x(t),Ft} is a scalar process;
• w = {w(t),Ft} and vx¯,η = {vx¯,η(t),Ft} are mutually independent Wiener processes
of dimension 1 + nA and 1, respectively;
• aD, bD, σD, aA, bA, and σA are non-anticipating path functionals from [0, T ] ×
C([0, T ],R1+nA) into R, R, R1×(1+nA), RnA , RnA , and RnA×(1+nA), respectively.
• κx > 0, ρw is a (1 + nA)-dimensional row vector, and ρv 6= 0.
To interpret, the agent believes that the growth of dividends and the evolution of the
additional macroeconomic variables are predictable, the conditional rates of change being
linear in a factor x. But he lacks confidence in his understanding of the data-generating
mechanism and finds the dynamics (SDE) of the factor ambiguous. Specifically, he lacks
confidence in the time-invariance of the unconditional mean, or the “instantaneous attrac-
tor,” of the factor and suspects the existence of a time-varying component in the latter,
thus decomposing it into a time-invariant component x¯ and a time-varying component η.
The agent’s perception of ambiguity regarding the time-invariant component, that is, pa-
rameter, is expressed by multiple parameter priors, which are for simplicity taken all to be
Dirac measures. The time-varying component is at this point restricted only by the minimal
technical requirement of square-integrability. For a detailed discussion, see Section 1.4.
The agent observes the dividends and the rest of the relevant macroeconomic variables,
that is, D andA, but not the factor x. If we define d by dd = dD/D, then d andA constitute
the observable component and x the unobservable component of the partially observable
process in Chapter 1.1 In conformity with the notation of Chapter 1, let y , (d,A>)>. The
dynamics (3.1)-(3.2) of the observation process can be rewritten compactly as
dy(t) = (a(t, y) + b(t, y)x(t)) dt+ σ(t, y) dw(t)
where the definitions of a, b, and σ are obvious. Assume that a, b, and σ satisfy the
1aD, bD, and so on are functionals in (D,A) rather than in (d,A). But by Liptser and Shiryaev (1977),
Lemma 4.9, there exist non-anticipating functionals a˜D, b˜D, and so on such that aD(t,D(·, ω), A(·, ω)) =
a˜D(t, d(·, ω), A(·, ω)), · · · , a.e. This substitution is implicit in the statement.
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assumptions of Chapter 1 (Assumptions 1.1-1.3). Let G = {Gt} be the augmented filtration
generated by y. G represents the accrual of the investor’s information. Under all data
priors, x(0)|G0 ∼ N(m0, γ0). All the common parameters, a, b, σ, κx, ρw, ρv, m0, and γ0,
are known to the agent.
To give meaning to the implied equity premium, we have to take a stance regarding
the true probability measure, and I take it to be a Qx¯,0 ∈ Q for some x¯ ∈ R. (From now
on, x¯ denotes this fixed value rather than a generic value in R.) That is, the set of data
priors Q as a statistical model is correctly specified, and there indeed is a time-invariant
value to which the unobservable factor reverts. Accordingly, in particular, the instantaneous
expected return of the stock, µR, is defined by
dR(t) =
dS(t) +D(t) dt
S(t)
= µR(t) dt+ σR(t) dw¯
x¯,0(t) (3.4)
where I have made the assumption that the equilibrium stock price is an Itoˆ process.2
In (3.4), µR and σR are adapted to G. So is the rate of net return on the bond (interest
rate) r. Observing equilibrium prices does not expand the agent’s information.
The agent has the Chen-Epstein (2002) recursive multiple-priors utility with log felicity.
His set of utility priors is constructed from the set of data priors described above as in
Chapter 1. In particular, under P 0,
dD(t)/D(t) = (aD(t) + bD(t)m
∗
t ) dt+ σD(t) d(t)
dR(t) = µR,P 0(t) dt+ σR(t) d(t)
µR,P 0(t) , µR(t) + σR(t)σ(t)−1b(t)(m∗t −mx¯,0(t)) (3.5)
where m∗t ≡ mx¯
∗
t ,η
∗
t (t) is the benchmark estimate of the conditional expectation of x(t) given
2When A is not perfectly correlated with D, the market is incomplete, viz. there are portfolio constraints.
And when there are portfolio constraints, equilibrium prices can be singular. See Detemple and Serrat (2003).
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Gt and  = {(t),Gt} is a (1 + nA)-dimensional Wiener process under P 0. Denote a trading
strategy by pi = {pi(t),Gt}, where pi(t) denotes the fraction of wealth invested in the stock
at time t, and the wealth process by W = {W (t),Gt}. The agent solves
sup
c,pi
min
ξ
EP
ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(c(t)) dt
subject to the budget constraint
dW (t) = W (t)(1− pi(t))r(t) dt+W (t)pi(t) (µR,P 0(t) dt+ σR(t) d(t))− c(t) dt.
A (Radner) equilibrium is a tuple (r, µR, σR) such that given the price coefficients
(r, µR, σR), the optimal consumption stream c
∗ equals the exogenous dividend stream D
and the optimal demand for the stock pi∗ is identically one.
3.3 Equilibria
Let
Ξ∗ , arg min
ξ∈Ξ
∫ T
0
e−βt log(D(t)) dt.
For an arbitrary consumption plan, here D, Ξ∗ can have multiple elements; cf. the unique-
ness of the worst-case density generator in the consumption/portfolio choice problem (Chap-
ter 2).
Proposition 3.1. Equilibria, possibly multiple, exist.
In all equilibria, the stock price process is given by
S(t) =
1− e−β(T−t)
β
D(t) (3.6)
and hence the cumulative return process by
dR(t) = (β + aD(t) + bD(t)m
x¯,0(t)) dt+ σD(t) dw¯
x¯,0(t). (3.7)
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To each ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ corresponds a unique equilibrium (rξ∗ , µξ∗R , σR = σD) where the equity
premium is given by
µξ
∗
R (t)− rξ
∗
(t) = σD(t)σD(t)
>︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
−σD(t)ξ∗(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity premium︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty premium
−σD(t)σ(t)−1b(t)(m∗t −mx¯,0(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
misspecification premium
and the interest rate by
rξ
∗
(t) = β+aD(t)+bD(t)m
x¯,0(t)+σD(t)σ(t)
−1b(t)(m∗t−mx¯,0(t))−σD(t)σD(t)>+σD(t)ξ∗(t).
The set of equilibria is {(rξ∗ , µξ∗R , σR = σD) : ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗}.
The equity premium is given by the sum of the risk premium
σDσ
>
D = Cov( dR, dc/c)
from the C-CAPM (Breeden, 1979) and premia that reflect the discrepancy between the
agent’s worst-case scenario P ξ
∗
and the true probability measure Qx¯,0.3
The latter can in turn be decomposed into two parts. The first, −σDξ∗, is the familiar
Chen-Epstein (2002) ambiguity premium and the other, −σDσ−1b(m∗−mx¯,0), is to account
for the discrepancy between the agent’s conditional expectation m∗ of the unobservable
factor and that under the true probability measure, mx¯,0. In Chen and Epstein (2002), the
center P 0 of the set of utility priors is taken to be the true probability measure (see their
Footnote 34), and consequently, the ambiguity premium consists only of the first part. On
the other hand, in the present model, the center of the set of one-step-ahead conditionals
does not a priori coincide with the one-step-ahead conditional under the true probability
measure but is determined by the agent’s learning. Specifically, under the true probability
measure, the error-in-model-estimation process (∆m∗,∆x¯∗) , (m∗−mx¯,0, x¯∗− x¯) is mean-
3See also Basak (2005), Equation (37). Basak considers heterogeneous agents in a partial observation
economy who have different prior distributions for the initial value of the unobservable process. In comparison
with his agents, here we have agents who are homogeneously off from the truth.
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reverting with volatility equal to the conditional ambiguity (see Propositions 1.2 and 1.6):
d∆m∗(t) = −
{
κx +
[
ρwσ(t)
> + (γ(t) + δ(t))b(t)>
]
(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)
}
∆m∗(t) dt
+ κx∆x¯
∗(t) + (σ(t)−1b(t)δ(t))> dw¯x¯,0(t)
d∆x¯∗(t) = −κ−1x σx¯∗(t)b(t)>(σ(t)σ(t)>)−1b(t)∆m∗(t) dt+ κ−1x (σ(t)−1b(t)σx¯∗(t))> dw¯x¯,0(t).
Hence, (i) the equity premium fluctuates around the Chen-Epstein uncertainty premium,
(ii) the fluctuation is more volatile when the market is ambiguous, (iii) the fluctuation
persists if and only if the agent has limited confidence (λ < ∞), and (iv) if σDσ−1b is a
positive constant (this will be the case in all the applications to be discussed below), then
the fluctuation is negatively correlated with the dividend growth. Regarding the last point,
to be explicit,
Corr(−σDσ−1bd∆m∗, dD/D) = Corr(−(σ−1bδ)> dw¯x¯,0, σD dw¯x¯,0)
= − σDσ
−1b
|σD||σ−1b| dt < 0.
The negative correlation can help generate the countercyclicality in equity premium docu-
mented in empirical studies (Fama and French, 1989; Ferson and Harvey, 1991).
It remains to determine Ξ∗. Suppose that there exists a Markov process Z that generates
G and define the value function by
J(t, Z) , min
ξ
EP
ξ
(∫ T
t
e−βs log(D(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Z(t) = Z)
subject to
dZ(s) = µZ(Z(s)) ds+ σZ(Z(s)) d(s).
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Proposition 3.2. ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ if and only if
ξ∗(t) = σ(t)−1b(t)×

+
√
2αδ(t)
−√2αδ(t)
indeterminate
if (∂ZJ(t, Z(t)))
>σZ(Z(t))σ(t)−1b(t)

< 0
> 0
= 0
where “indeterminate” means “any number in [−√2αδ(t),√2αδ(t)].”
(∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b is the marginal effect of an increase in the estimated value of the unob-
servable factor on the expected change over the next instant in the agent’s continuation
utility. Hence, when it is positive (negative), the agent views the factor as overestimated
(underestimated) and demands a high (low) equity premium. Alternatively, we can inter-
pret the ambiguity premium also as coming from the shadow hedging demand (see Chapter
2). Further specification of the ambiguity premium will be carried out in the applications.
3.4 Declining Equity Premium & Rising Interest Rate
We observed in Chapter 1 that learning about time-invariant factors of the data-generating
mechanism, as represented by the parameter x¯, generates a decreasing trend in the a pos-
teriori ambiguity δ. Thus, we can expect the premium for bearing ambiguity to decrease
over time. This is indeed the case. In this section, I present a special case in which the
equity premium is uniquely determined and has a decreasing component. The declining
equity premium is naturally accompanied by an initially low but rising interest rate. These
trends over the latter part of the 20th century have been documented by Merton (1980),
Blanchard (1993), and Jagannathan et al. (2000), to name a few.
Suppose that the dividend volatility is constant and there is no additional state variable
in the economy other than the dividends:
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+ σD dw(t)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρw dw(t) + ρv dvx¯,0(t).
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That is, a ≡ 0, b ≡ 1, and σ ≡ σD > 0. Then, the state variables in the agent’s problem
are Z = (D,m∗, x¯∗).
Lemma 3.1.
(∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b =
e−βt − e−βT
β
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
1− e−κx(s−t)
κx
ds
1
σ2D
(ρwσD + γ(t) + δ(t))
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
(
(s− t)− 1− e
−κx(s−t)
κx
)
ds
1
σ2D
σx¯∗(t)
κx
.
Proposition 3.3. ξ∗(t) = −σ−1D
√
2αδ(t) for all t < T . Accordingly, the unique equilibrium
is given by
µR(t)− r(t) = σ2D +
√
2αδ(t)− (m∗t −mx¯,0(t))
r(t) = β +m∗t − σ2D −
√
2αδ(t).
Thus, the ambiguity premium
√
2αδ(t) monotonically decreases over time to its limit
value
√
2α
σ2D
√(κx + ρw
σD
)2
+ (1 + λ−1)
(
ρv
σD
)2
−
√(
κx +
ρw
σD
)2
+
(
ρv
σD
)2 12
(see Section 1.6.3). The agent’s ambiguity aversion α affects both the limit value of the
ambiguity premium and the rate at which it decreases. The misspecification premium
−(m∗−mx¯,0) vanishes in the limit if the estimated long-run return x¯∗ converges to the true
value x¯.4 If, furthermore, the agent in fact has full confidence in the reference likelihood and
only finds the long-run return ambiguous, then the equity premium will eventually reach
the level the standard model predicts.
To have a sense of how fast the equity premium is to decrease, I plot one simulated path
of it (thick line), together with the interest rate (thin line), in the left panel of Figure 3.1.
4See Footnote 17 in Chapter 1.
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The dynamics of the economy are calibrated based on Bansal et al. (2011):5
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+ 0.0249 dw(t)
dx(t) = 0.3038(0.0180− x(t)) dt+ 9.478× 10−4 dvx¯,0(t).
Time is always measured in years. β = 0.03, λ = ∞, and α = 16. β = 0.03 is within
the standard range. High (in fact, full) confidence and α = 16 are assumed to match
approximately the observed rate of decline in equity premium; see, for example, Blanchard
(1993), Figures 10 and 11.
Given in the right panel of Figure 3.1 for comparison are the equity premium and the
interest rate under the prevailing form of ambiguity, that is, IID ambiguity, based on the
same realization of the economy. To be precise, by the IID ambiguity model I mean a
version of Miao (2009): at each time-state, the agent Bayes-updates the reference and true
probability measure Qx¯,0, after which there still remains an exogenous ambiguity in the form
of an IID ambiguity. See Section 2.5.3 of this dissertation as well as Miao’s paper. Under
the IID ambiguity model, the equity premium is constant at σ2D + σD ξ¯IID where ξ¯IID ≥ 0
is the constant bound on density generators. Hence, to generate time variations in equity
premium, one needs stochastic volatility. But even then, it is still difficult to generate a
trend.
3.5 Equity Premium & Signal Precision
Next, I show that when the agent learns under ambiguity, higher precision of signals can
increase the equity premium.
To simplify discussion, continue to assume constant volatility and assume further that
(i) the dividend stream D and the instantaneous expected growth rate of dividends x are
uncorrelated (ρw = 0) and (ii) there is a signal to x. (D itself is a signal to x, but I
reserve the term signal for this new process, which is to represent news circulating in the
5I annualized the monthly values Bansal et al. (2011) use for the dynamics of aggregate consumption
(second row of their Table I).
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Figure 3.1: Declining equity premium and rising interest rate. The thick lines show the
equity premium and the thin lines the interest rate (annual and decimal). The left plot shows
these rates predicted by the present model and the right plot those by an IID ambiguity
model a` la Miao (2009), from a common realization of the economy. Under the IID ambiguity
model, the equity premium is constant at σ2D + σD ξ¯IID, ξ¯IID ≥ 0. I set the value of ξ¯IID so
that the resulting constant premium equals the mean of the premia in the left plot. First 5
years are discarded.
economy other than the dividend stream. I will refer to the dividend stream as a signal as
the dividend-signal.) Specifically, the dynamics of the economy are given by
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+ σD(
√
1− r2DA, rDA) dw(t)
dA(t) = x(t) dt+ σA(0, 1) dw(t)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ ρv dvx¯,0(t)
where σD and σA are positive without loss of generality. That is, a ≡ 0, b ≡ (1, 1)>, and
σ ≡
 σD
√
1− r2DA σDrDA
0 σA
 .
The process A denotes the signal and it is correlated with D with correlation rDA ∈ (−1, 1);
see Detemple (1986). By the ambiguity premium, I will be referring to
√
2αδ(∞) =
limt→∞
√
2αδ(t).
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Figure 3.2: Equity premium and signal precision. Left plot: Equity premium (annual,
decimal) as a function of the signal precision, for different levels of correlation between the
signal and the dividend-signal. Right plot: Effective precision as a function of the signal
precision. (D,x) and α = 16 are calibrated as in Figure 3.1. λ = 0.01.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose rDA > 0. Then, the ambiguity premium is strictly increasing
on hA ∈ [0, rDAhD] and is strictly decreasing on hA ∈ (rDAhD,∞).
The reason is as follows. Define the precision of the signal by hA , 1/σA and that of
the dividend-signal by hD , 1/σD. Let also
heff = heff(hA) ,
√
h2D − 2hDhArDA + h2A
1− r2DA
, 0 ≤ hA <∞.
heff is the effective precision of D and A en masse; σD and σA enter the filtering equations
only via b>(σσ>)−1b = h2eff. Now, the ambiguity premium is strictly increasing in the
a posteriori model uncertainty δ(∞) and the latter is strictly decreasing in the effective
precision heff. But when the signal and the dividend-signal are positively correlated (rDA >
0), for low signal precision an increase in the signal precision decreases the effective precision.
To elaborate on the last point, suppose rDA > 0. When hA = 0, we see w2 and heff =
hD/
√
1− r2DA > hD. As hA increases from 0, the signal becomes less informative about
w2 but more informative about x. Initially, the former effect dominates until the signal
becomes effectively redundant (heff = hD). See Figure 3.2.
The ambiguity premium is strictly increasing in hA everywhere when rDA ≤ 0 because
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in general two signals to a common factor are more informative when negatively correlated.
Veronesi (2000), in a Bayesian framework, also observes that for agents more risk-
averse than the log agent, higher precision of signals can increase the equity premium; see
his Proposition 3(a) and the discussion following it. To elaborate, suppose the expected
growth rate of dividends is constant. When it is known (infinite precision), there is no
hedging demand. On the other hand, when it is unobservable (zero precision), a negative
shock to dividends increases the hedging demand for highly risk-averse agents and the
increase in the hedging demand counteracts the direct decreasing effect of the negative
shock on the stock price. Hence a lower covariance between stock returns and dividend
growth and a lower equity premium. However, the relation between the equity premium
and the signal precision just explained does not hold for a log agent because a log agent is
myopic if he is Bayesian; see Veronesi’s Lemma 3(a). In contrast, a multiple-priors log agent
hedges, and in the present model, an increase in the signal precision can partly account for
high equity premium.
3.6 Equity Premium & Conditional Variance of Returns
The classical Sharpe-Lintner CAPM or the I-CAPM of Merton (1973) with constant in-
vestment opportunities implies that the equity premium is proportional to return variance.
More generally, a positive linear relationship between the conditional equity premium and
the conditional variance of returns has long been subject to estimation in the literature.
However, “[d]espite an extensive empirical literature devoted to the estimation of such a
premium, the search for a significant time-invariant expected return-volatility tradeoff type
relationship has largely proven elusive” (Bollerslev et al., 2009).
In the present model, if the agent knew the true probability measure, the equity pre-
mium would equal the conditional return variance |σD(t)|2, resulting in a proportional
relationship. But with the ambiguity and misspecification premia, not only there is not
a deterministic relationship between the equity premium and conditional return variance,
but, when Corr( dD/D, dx) < 0, the sign of the correlation between the two is uncertain.
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To investigate the intertemporal relationship between the equity premium and condi-
tional return variance, suppose that the conditional variance of dividend growth (and that of
returns) |σD|2 is time-varying, following a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process (Gennotte and Marsh,
1993):6
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+
√
A(t)(
√
1− r2DA, rDA) dw(t)
dA(t) = κA(A¯−A(t)) dt+ ςA
√
A(t)(0, 1) dw(t)
dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ (ρw,1, ρw,2) dw(t) + ρv dvx¯,0(t)
where (i) κAA¯ > ς
2
A/2 so that A stays away from zero and (ii) rDA ∈ (−1, 1). That is,
a(t, y) =
 0
κA(A¯−A(t))
 , b ≡
 1
0
 , and σ(t, y) = √A(t)

√
1− r2DA rDA
0 ςA
 .
In this setup, the dividend stream is a signal with time-varying precision. The state variables
in the agent’s problem are Z = (D,A,m∗, x¯∗, γ, δ, σx¯∗).
Lemma 3.2.
(∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b =
e−βt − e−βT
β
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
1− e−κx(s−t)
κx
ds
ρw,1
√
A
√
1− r2DA + γ + δ
A(1− r2DA)
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
(
(s− t)− 1− e
−κx(s−t)
κx
)
ds
κ−1x σx¯∗
A(1− r2DA)
.
The first and the third terms of (∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b are positive for all t < T and all Z in its
natural domain. On the other hand, if ρw,1 < 0, then the second term may be negative; and
when (∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b changes sign as a result, the ambiguity premium will jump between
±√2αδ(t). Compare this with the constant (positive) sign of (∂ZJ)>σZσ−1b in Section 3.4.
In Figure 3.3, I plot a simulated path of return variance and the implied ambiguity
premia when the growth rate of dividends dD/D and the instantaneous expected growth
rate of dividends x are uncorrelated (left) and when they are negatively correlated (right).
6In Gennotte and Marsh (1993), the expected growth rate of dividends is constant and known.
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Figure 3.3: Conditional return variance and ambiguity premium. Thin lines: Conditional
variance of dividend growth = conditional variance of stock returns = risk premium =σ2D.
Thick lines: Ambiguity premium
√
2αδ. The correlation between the growth rate of div-
idends dD/D and the instantaneous expected growth rate of dividends x is 0 (left) and
−0.99 (right). The simulated path of return variance is common to the two plots. λ = 0.01
and α = 16. Initial years are discarded.
The case of a positive correlation between dD/D and x is qualitatively similar to that of
zero correlation and hence is omitted. Also, the realization of return variance is common to
the two plots. The economy is calibrated again based on Bansal et al. (2011) (see Footnote
5), but differently from their model, a correlation between dD/D and x is allowed:
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+
√
A(t)(1, 0) dw(t)
dA(t) = 0.0120((0.0249)2 −A(t)) dt+ 3.889× 10−4
√
A(t)(0, 1) dw(t)
dx(t) = 0.3038(0.0180− x(t)) dt+ 9.478× 10
−4√
ρ2w,1 + ρ
2
v
((ρw,1, 0) dw(t) + ρv dv
x¯,0(t)).
When Corr( dD/D, dx) ≥ 0 (see the left plot), the ambiguity premium follows the
return variance with some lag. This is intuitive: the ambiguity about the unobservable
state of the economy and consequently the premium for bearing it are high when the signal
to the unobservable state has been imprecise over the recent past.
The simple intuition fails, however, when Corr( dD/D, dx) < 0: in the right plot,
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the ambiguity premium is strongly negatively correlated with the conditional variance of
returns. The reason is as discussed in Section 1.6.2. To recall, the filtering equations under
the present calibration are
dm∗t = κx(x¯
∗
t −m∗t ) dt+
(
ρw,1 +
γ(t) + δ(t)√
A(t)
)
(1, 0) d(t)
δ˙(t) =
(
ρw,1 +
γ(t)√
A(t)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
var( dmx¯,η(t)|Gt)/dt
−2κxδ(t)−
(
ρw,1 +
γ(t) + δ(t)√
A(t)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight on the innovation squared
+ 2θ(t)Ix¯(t)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity about the time-invariant factor x¯
+ λ−1ρ2v︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity about the time-variant factor η
.
We revise m∗t in consideration of two factors, the estimation error and the variation in x(t).
First, the correction of the estimation error +(γ(t) + δ(t))/
√
A(t) d(t) is increasing in the
innovation d(t) (when, for example, d(t) > 0, it is likely that the current estimate m∗t is
an underestimation) and is decreasing in the imprecision
√
A(t) of the dividend-signal (the
less informative the signal, the less weight given on the new evidence). Second, m∗t as an
estimate of x(t) is also to be revised by +κx(x¯
∗
t −m∗t ) dt+ (ρw,1, 0) d(t), to account for the
corresponding changes in x(t); here, d(t) is acting as an analogue of dw(t). As is intuitive,
uncertainty resolves more quickly when the new evidence is taken more seriously; note in δ˙(t)
the negative of the weight on the innovation squared. Now, the twist is that +(ρw,1, 0) d(t)
not only is to account for the state dynamics but in effect it also acts as if it were a weight
on the new evidence. And when ρw,1 < 0, one role of the innovation (an analogue of
dw(t)) can counteract the other (an indicator of over/underestimation). For example, if the
stationary level of the weight on the innovation is negative and is large in absolute value,
then an improvement in the quality of the dividend-signal (a decrease in A) will decrease the
absolute value of the weight, which is indistinguishable from there being little innovation,
and uncertainty will rise. Of course, we have (ρw,1 + γ(t)/
√
A(t))2 (first term of δ˙(t)) as
well, but under the current calibration, the mechanism just explained is dominant and we
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between the equity premium and conditional return variance as
a function of the agent’s ambiguity aversion α. The correlation coefficients are computed
using the simulated path of return variance in Figure 3.3 and the implied path of estimation
ambiguity.
have a negative correlation between the signal imprecision A and estimation ambiguity δ.
Finally, in an economy populated by log agents, estimation ambiguity has a direct effect on
the equilibrium ambiguity premium.
A negative correlation between the conditional variance of dividend growth and esti-
mation ambiguity makes uncertain the relationship between the equity premium and the
conditional variance of stock returns. The equity premium is given by the sum of the risk
premium, which is equal to conditional return variance and hence is perfectly positively cor-
related with the latter, and the ambiguity premium
√
2αδ(t). Hence, when δ is negatively
correlated with conditional return variance, the correlation between the equity premium
and conditional return variance is decreasing in the agent’s ambiguity aversion α, ranging
from one to negative values. See Figure 3.4.
3.7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Pick some ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗. Then, we have a Lucas economy populated
by a subjective expected utility maximizer with unique utility prior P ξ
∗
. Thus, by standard
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results, there exists a unique equilibrium in which (3.6) holds and
pi∗(t) = (σR(t)σR(t)>)−1(µR,P 0(t)− r(t) + σR(t)ξ∗(t)) = 1.
Now, (3.7) follows from the direct differentiation of (3.6); the equity premium from pi∗
and the definition (3.5) of µR,P 0 ; and the interest rate from the expression for the equity
premium and (3.7).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. To conform to the standard presentation of a control problem,
I rewrite J as
J(t, Z) = min
ξ
EP
0
(∫ T
t
e−βs log(Dξ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Zξ(t) = Z)
subject to
dZξ(s) = µZ(Z
ξ(s)) ds+ σZ(Z
ξ(s))( d(s) + ξ(s) ds).
The HJB equation is
0 = min
ξ
(
e−βt logD + ∂tJ + (∂ZJ)>(µZ + σZξ) +
1
2
(∂2ZJ) ◦ (σZσ>Z )
)
.
The minimization problem taken separately is
ξ∗(t) = arg min
ξ∈Ξ(t)
(∂ZJ)
>σZξ.
Now recall that σξ = b(m−m∗t ) by definition where |m−m∗t | ≤
√
2αδ(t).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For later reference, I compute (∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b for the Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross stochastic volatility case (see Section 3.6):
dD(t)/D(t) = x(t) dt+
√
A(t)(
√
1− r2DA, rDA) dw(t)
dA(t) = κA(A¯−A(t)) dt+ ςA
√
A(t)(0, 1) dw(t)
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dx(t) = κx(x¯− x(t)) dt+ (ρw,1, ρw,2) dw(t) + ρv dvx¯,0(t).
The constant volatility case is the special case in which (i) κA = ςA = 0 and A ≡ σD and
(ii) rDA = ρw,2 = 0.
Now, the state variables are Z = (D,A,m∗, x¯∗, γ, δ, σx¯∗). First,
σZσ
−1b =
D, 0, ρw,1√A
√
1− r2DA + γ + δ
A(1− r2DA)
,
κ−1x σx¯∗
A(1− r2DA)
, 0, 0, 0
>
Thus, expectedly because A is unambiguous, ∂AJ is irrelevant. Next, observe
Dξ(s) = D exp
(∫ s
t
m∗,ξ(τ) dτ
)
exp
(∫ s
t
σD(τ)( d(τ) + ξ(t) dτ)− 1
2
∫ s
t
|σD(τ)|2 dτ
)
,
m∗,ξ(s) = e−κx(s−t)
m∗
+
∫ s
t
eκx(τ−t)
κxx¯∗,ξτ dτ +
ρw + γ(τ) + δ(τ)√
A(τ)
√
1− r2DA
(1, 0)
 ( d(τ) + ξ(τ) dτ)
 ,
and
x¯∗,ξs = x¯
∗ +
∫ s
t
κ−1x σx¯∗(τ)√
A(τ)
√
1− r2DA
(1, 0)( d(τ) + ξ(τ) dτ).
Thus,
log(Dξ(s)) = logD +
1− e−κx(s−t)
κx
m∗ +
(
(s− t)− 1− e
−κx(s−t)
κx
)
x¯∗ + f(s, t, ξ)
where f is independent of D, m∗, and x¯∗. Finally, by the envelope theorem,
(∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b =
e−βt − e−βT
β
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
1− e−κx(s−t)
κx
ds
ρw,1
√
A
√
1− r2DA + γ + δ
A(1− r2DA)
+
∫ T
t
e−βs
(
(s− t)− 1− e
−κx(s−t)
κx
)
ds
κ−1x σx¯∗
A(1− r2DA)
.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. Observe that
(
e−βt − e−βT
β
)−1 ∫ T
t
e−βs
1− e−κx(s−t)
κx
ds
=
1
κx
− β
κx(β + κx)
1− e−(β+κx)(T−t)
1− e−β(T−t) ∈
(
1
β + κx
,
1
κx
)
and that as t→∞
1
σ2D
(ρwσD + γ(t) + δ(t)) ↓
√(
κx +
ρw
σD
)2
+ (1 + λ−1)
(
ρv
σD
)2
− κx > −κx
(a large initial value for δ is implicit). Hence,
(
e−βt − e−βT
β
)−1
(∂ZJ)
>σZσ−1b > 1 +
1
κx
(−κx) = 0
and the claim follows from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. First,
δ(∞) = lim
t→∞ δ(t) = h
−2
eff
(√
κ2x + (1 + λ
−1)(ρvheff)2 −
√
κ2x + (ρvheff)
2
)
and it is easy to see that δ(∞) is strictly decreasing in heff. Next,
∂h2eff
∂hA
=
−2hDrDA + 2hA
1− r2DA
.
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